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The Jean Monnet Chair
The Jean Monnet Chair was created in 1988 by decision of the Academic 
Council of the European University Institute, with the financial support of 
the European Community. The aim of this initiative was to promote studies 
and discussion on the problems, internal and external, of European Union 
following the Single European Act, by associating renowned academics and 
personalities from the political and economic world to the teaching and 
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Lecture #1 -  Theories of Regulation*
The twenty years between 1970 and 1990 witnessed massive changes in 
the relationship between business and government in all advanced indus­
trialized democracies. In the U.S., two roughly parallel but opposite 
trends occurred: a substantial scaling back of economic regulation (the 
control of prices, profits and entry in infrastructural industries) accom­
panied by a dramatic expansion of environmental, health and safety regu­
lation. In Japan, strong centralized planning combined with nationalized 
operation of infrastructural industries slowly gave way to liberalization, 
privatization, and competition.
In Europe, pursuit of economic integration within the European Eco­
nomic Communities led to a movement to reduce regulatory barriers to 
intra-European trade, but the less ambitious notion of “harmonization” 
gave rise to a more ambitious set of policies paralleling developments in 
Japan and the U.S. In infrastructural industries, European integration has 
meant not just coordination among national monopolies, but increasing 
liberalization of hitherto monopolized and heavily regulated markets. 
And harmonization alone does not explain the growing role of the Com­
mission of the European Communities as a regulator in the environmen­
tal, health and safety field. Indeed, the Single Europe Act, through such 
measures as new Articles 130 R, S and T of the Treaty of Rome, strongly 
institutionalizes regulatory functions in the EEC when the multinational 
organization is more effective at attaining the goal of protection of the 
environment and public health, regardless of the connectedness of the en­
suing Regulations and Directives to facilitating trade among the Member 
States.
Many explanations have been put forth for both the rise of protective 
regulation and the fall of economic regulation, but the most common ex­
planations for each are mutually inconsistent. That is, economic deregu­
lation is said to be associated with a new “conservative ideology”, such as 
Reaganism in the U.S. or Thatcherism in the U.K., whereas environmen­
tal, worker and consumer protectionism is associated with growing sup­
port for state intervention to protect the public from abuses by managers 
of the institutions of economic production (usually capitalistic, but some­
* The four lectures comprising this Jean Monnet Paper were given as seminars by Roger G. Noll, within 
the framework of the Jean Monnet Chair of the European Policy Unit, to staff and researchers of the 



























































































times “out of control” public companies). Another common explanation, a 
softer version of the concept of ideological shift, is the power of new 
ideas developed during the 1960s. Within economics, the new idea, aris­
ing from extensive empirical studies of economic regulation, was that 
economic regulation was a sham: rather than protecting consumers from 
monopolies, it harmed them by creating inefficient providers of service 
who used their monopoly position to feather their own nests. Elsewhere, 
the new idea was scientific information about the harms arising from in­
dustrialization through environmental degradation (e.g., Rachel Carson’s 
Silent Spring) or through unsafe products and workplaces (e.g., Ralph 
Nader’s Unsafe at Any Speed).
The difficulty with these accounts is that they are superficial. Ideologi­
cal conflict between interventionism and liberalism is as old as democ­
racy, and the rise of environmental and safety regulation falsifies the no­
tion that somehow, around 1970, liberalism gained an upper hand. More­
over, the “new ideas” of the 1960s were not very new, and in any case 
were often conflicting. The advocates of economic deregulation won only 
a partial victory, for in no country was the degree of economic deregula­
tion as extensive as the economic research concluded was warranted. In 
other regulatory arenas, economic advice was largely ignored, especially 
in the environmental field. Likewise, the advocates of protective regula­
tion surely did not win a resounding victory, for the measures adopted 
fell far short of their goals, and in many instances the institutional mech­
anisms for achieving even the scaled-back goals proved ineffective. In­
deed, by the early 1980s both economists and advocates of stricter mea­
sures to protect the environment and public health could agree that much 
of the effect of regulation in this area was to protect established industries 
(see Bruce Ackerman and William Hassler, Clean Air I Dirty Coal).
To understand the development of regulatory policy during the reform 
period requires a comprehensive theory of how and why government 
policies change. Policy reform, like such prosaic acts as purchasing a 
product, hiring a worker, or casting a vote, is the result of decisions by 
individuals, who presumably bring to bear on all of these decisions more 
or less the same capabilities, values and purposiveness. “Why regulatory 
reform”, therefore, is likely to be answered in much the same way as 
“Why any policy change”, or even “Why any purposive social action?"
Scholars in almost all social scientific disciplines have contributed some 
part of the answer to these questions. Here I focus on one category of 
conceptual models to explain the public sector: liberal methodological 
individualism. This category of social explanation adopts the view that the 
appropriate unit of observation is a person. Social actions can be under­
stood and evaluated solely by examining the decisions of individuals and 
the effects of actions on those individuals.
The normative component of liberal methodological individualism is 
that a state of a society (including a nation) is deemed better or worse 




























































































cording to the values that the members themselves hold. Thus, normative 
criteria based on the values of only some members (e.g. monarchy, 
theocracy) or on serving the interests of institutions (e.g. the state) are 
precluded. The positive, or scientific, component of this approach regards 
individual members of society as causes, rather than effects, of societal 
changes. Policy is the product of interactions, sometimes conflictual, 
among members of society, and the appropriate unit of analysis for un­
derstanding, predicting and perhaps even controlling policy is the indi­
viduals who seek to affect it.
Liberal methodological individualism is not without critics, but it does 
constitute the core of much of contemporary social science, especially in 
economics and psychology, but also to a limited extent in political science, 
sociology and philosophy. As an economist who dabbles in these other 
fields, it is the approach that 1 am competent to take. Hence, the point of 
this essay is to lay out what liberal theory has to say about policy change, 
with applications to regulatory reform.
Normative Theories of Government
Although the aim of my analysis is to develop a positive (or causal) the­
ory of regulatory policy change, a useful starting place is normative the­
ory, which asks what policy-makers ought to do, using liberal principles 
to evaluate the alternatives. Of course, normative theories of what the 
state ought to do can also be regarded as theories of what the state actu­
ally will do, assuming that all relevant individuals (the ones who make 
decisions that affect policy) apply the principles of a normative theory. 
Plato’s philosopher-king, Burke’s other-regarding public servant, and 
Weber’s scientific bureaucrat provide examples of the linkages between 
normative and positive theories.
Welfare Economics
Because regulatory policy is predominantly an instrument of economic 
policy in that it is applied to economic actions such as production, trans­
action, and consumption, the logical starting point for a review of nor­
mative theories is welfare economics. The underlying premises of welfare 
economics are, first, that people evaluate alternative actions in a norma- 
tively meaningful way, and second, that these actions can meaningfully be 
aggregated across individuals. The evaluation principle requires that out­
comes be expressed in a common unit of value. That is, one can compare 
three bananas to three oranges -  and to three tons of air pollution, three 
sprained thumbs from a hazardous workplace device, and three deaths 
from cancer from a toxic chemical.
Conventionally, the unit of comparison is money, owing primarily to 




























































































value (goods, time and effort, even political support). For every social 
activity, whether eating a pear, listening to an opera, or setting a regula­
tory standard, a person is regarded as having a “willingness to pay” 
(WTP) for that action. The WTP is the maximum amount that a person 
could be induced to part with to secure the social action. Because this 
amount could also be used to do many other things (including buy other 
goods and services), it has normative meaning in that it provides a quanti­
tative measure of the amount of sacrifice of other valuable economic 
goods and services a person is willing to make to achieve the end in ques­
tion. Of course, the person may not actually have to pay the WTP to ob­
tain this end. The WTP for a cold beer on a hot day may substantially ex­
ceed its price, generating a net positive benefit (WTP minus price) for the 
person who buys it. Net WTP, or “surplus”, then becomes the measure of 
the increment to welfare arising from the social action. It measures the 
extent to which a person experiences more benefit than cost.
The premise of welfare economics is that society should take actions 
that maximize the net WTP of all of its members. For example, benefit- 
cost analysis seeks to ascertain the size of a public program that maxi­
mizes the difference between benefits and costs, where both benefits and 
costs are calculated using the WTP principle. Benefits are the WTP for 
the program, while costs are the WTP for using the resources consumed 
by the program in the best possible alternative way.
An important issue in welfare economics is how to deal with the fact 
that income strongly influences a person’s WTP. One approach takes the 
view that income distribution should be ignored when evaluating a policy. 
Income redistribution should be decided as a separate matter, and then 
once society has concluded how egalitarian it will be, it can move on to 
deciding the size and scope of the public sector. The other approach takes 
the view that income distribution and other social policies are inseparable 
(because the act of having a public sector alters income distribution), so 
that it ought to be taken into account when evaluating programs. The lat­
ter approach leads to weighting the WTP of the poor more heavily.
A cornerstone of welfare economics -  its “First Theorem” -  is that if 
markets are perfectly competitive, they allocate goods and services in a 
manner that maximizes net WTP. Perfect competition means three things: 
large numbers of buyers and sellers so that no one is the captive of any­
one else (and hence no one has monopoly power); perfect information, 
meaning that everyone is equally informed about prices, product quali­
ties, and the consequences of economic actions; and complete internaliza­
tion, meaning that in any economic transaction, all of the benefits and 
costs are experienced by the transacting parties without spillover effects 
on others.
The First Theorem of Welfare Economics provides the “market fail­
ure” theory of regulatory policy. Because perfect competition produces 
the best possible outcome (given that one is satisfied with income distri­




























































































feet competition are not satisfied. Thus, regulation (if its costs are suffi­
ciently low so as not to offset its benefits) is justified if a market cannot 
sustain many sellers (natural monopoly), if production or consumption 
produces third-party effects (environmental degradation), or if some 
participants in a market are inadequately informed (consumer and worker 
protection). The last category, of course, turns on regulation being a su­
perior alternative to simply informing people, letting them sue for dam­
ages if injured, or otherwise relying on some policy other than regulation 
to solve the problem.
The regulatory reform era could be explained by the market failure 
theory if, in the 1960s, events transpired that changed the extent of mar­
ket failure. If some monopolies stopped being natural, or became other­
wise sufficiently less powerful that the amount that they could extract 
from their customers was less than the cost of regulating them, economic 
deregulation would ensue. If some consumers and workers became sub­
stantially less capable of evaluating products and workplaces, most plau­
sibly because hazards became more numerous and complicated due to 
growth and technological change, safety regulation might pass the 
threshold whereby its benefits exceeded its costs. And, if economic 
growth increased pollution, or if new scientific knowledge increased the 
best estimates of the consequences of pollution, more vigorous environ­
mental regulation would be enacted.
Ideology and ideas theories of policy change are not in principle in­
compatible with the welfare economics of market failure. Ideology can be 
interpreted as the way members of society evaluate both economic and 
political outcomes. If the children of the 1960s placed higher values on, 
say, the natural environment in relation to prosaic consumption activities, 
the WTP for pollution abatement would increase, thereby increasing the 
optimal scale and scope of environmental policy. Ideas, in the form of 
new knowledge about how the world works but without an ideological 
aspect, have the same effect. The idea of a pending ecological catastrophe 
(e.g. ozone depletion), when presented with evidentiary documentation, 
raises the expected cost of ozone-depleting activities, and hence the 
magnitude of the market failure associated with them, and hence the op­
timal effort to control them. Ideas and ideology provide a way to connect 
changes in policy to changes in the knowledge base and evaluation prin­
ciples that underpin WTP, which in turn determines the net benefits of 
public policies.
Of course, the source of ideas and even ideology can be a discipline 
other than economics, with its focus on economic valuations through 
transactions (or, at least, in principle transactions for things that as a 
practical matter cannot be traded or for which trading is prohibited). For 
example, implicit in ecological policy analysis is an ideology (personal 
evaluation mechanism) that gives great weight to maximizing natural ge­
netic diversity on earth. It prescribes putting forth extensive effort to 




























































































species, to maximize the survival probability of the present array of liv­
ing organisms in the face of environmental change or the mutation of a 
more effective predator (whether a vims or a Tyranosaurus Rex). Like­
wise, regulatory policy has a strong engineering component, and one can 
easily deduce implicit normative theories from engineering practice. For 
example, resource and environment policy can be governed by the desire 
to maximize engineering efficiency (maximize output per unit of resource 
use, or maximize the extent to which technical economies of scale are 
captured), ignoring the organizational efficiency or other sources of eco­
nomic value that might be ignored by this objective. Or, from moral 
philosophy and ethics, one might ascribe value primarily to the process 
by which public decisions are made: whether they maximally preserve the 
dignity and autonomy of those who are affected by policy, and serve to 
promote justice and fairness as ends rather than as means to maximizing 
the net output of the public sector.
The commonality among the normative theories thusfar described is 
that they use evaluation mechanisms that are capable of assigning values 
to alternative actions so that one can identify the best action. Whereas 
economic valuation is rooted in actual decisions (market transactions), the 
principle behind welfare economics is that the same evaluation method 
can be applied where transactions are rare or nonexistent, with the same 
normative content ascribed to them. Likewise, the other valuation tech­
niques presume that one can give concrete meaning to more and less, 
better and worse. Energy-efficiency and technical economies of scale are 
clearly such notions, as are the number of species and the extent of ge­
netic variation within a species. Dignitary values and procedural justice 
are more elusive, but their adherents still consider alternative actions as 
producing more or less in ways that can be observed.
From the perspective of welfare economics, none of these approaches 
is necessarily hostile to normative economic policy analysis, although in 
practice they often are. Each can be regarded as simply standing behind 
someone’s WTP. An engineer, therefore, is simply giving greater weight 
to resource costs (or capturing scale economies) than someone who seeks 
to minimize economic costs. Thus, the engineering WTP may be peculiar, 
but it does not raise fundamental problems for finding the policy that 
maximizes WTP. But problems arise if the engineer insists that the WTPs 
of others (who are not using engineering evaluation techniques) be ig­
nored. The principle of “de gustibus no est disputandum" admits the pe­
culiar tastes of the engineer, but it accords no special status to any par­
ticular method of evaluating alternatives. In general, this principle tends 
to be bad news for engineering evaluation, for research indicates that 
people are more prone to undervalue than to overvalue technical effi­
ciency, relative to a standard of economic benefits and costs. Consequent­
ly, engineering and economic analyses often are in conflict, with en­





























































































The preceding highlights the difference between welfare economics and 
these other normative theories. Welfare economics adopts the position 
that values are derived by aggregation over all members of a society. 
This allows engineers and ecologists to hold their particular normative 
views, but it does not allow their WTPs to be given more weight.
Democratic Theory
A fundamentally different approach is taken by normative democratic 
theory in political philosophy. The relevant normative index in demo­
cratic theory is the vote, not WTP. The policy that is normatively com­
pelling is the one that gamers the biggest majority in a democratic pro­
cess. The more idealistic version (associated with populism in the United 
States) assumes that voters are sufficiently informed to have reasoned 
assessments of policies. Hence, the best outcomes are attained through di­
rect democracy whereby voters make policy decisions. The initiative and 
referendum, the Athenian republic, and the New England town meeting 
are examples of institutions seeking to bring to practice the idealistic ver­
sion of democratic theory.
The more practical version, underpinning the institutions of represen­
tative democracy and a professional, scientific bureaucracy (e.g. the 
French écoles and the Japanese “samurai bureaucrat” from the University 
of Tokyo), imagines democracy as a system in which voters not only are 
unable to make informed policy judgements, but also know that they lack 
such capabilities, and so delegate policy decisions to elected officials and 
civil servants. The latter, in turn, implement what is best, but are led to 
do so by seeking ratification of their values by the electorate. As a posi­
tive theory, normative democratic theory turns on political competition 
among candidates and the ability of voters to ascertain the character of 
these candidates, for otherwise majority support could not be normatively 
compelling. Thus, normative democratic theory has an important com­
monality with normative economic theory in that the former assumes 
something like a perfectly competitive political system. Just as consumers 
in a competitive market deal with many buyers and so are not faced with 
an absence of effective choice, so voters have sufficiently many political 
choices to permit voting to carry definitive information about the general 
character of public policy. And just as consumers in perfect competition 
know as much about a product as its producer, and so cannot be victim­
ized by fraud or negligence, so do voters know enough about candidates 
so that they can ascertain which one will pursue the best policy.
Democratic theory has little to say about why regulatory reform 
emerged, other than that somehow it was all for the best. The sources of 
the values that led to reform are not the focus of analysis. Instead, policy­
making officials did what they did because, retrospectively, voters would 
approve in subsequent elections. The difficulty with democratic theory, 




























































































change in political support for regulatory institutions. But democratic 
theory can be merged with welfare economics (or any other theory of the 
source of values) to be more predictive, for it then can tell us why votes 
might change. Specifically, if the marriage is between democratic theory 
and welfare economics, votes change because a majority of voters has a 
lower WTP for the status quo of regulatory policy. Voter WTPs can 
change for the same basic reasons as before: the facts have changed (e.g. 
the natural monopoly has disappeared or pollution has gotten worse), the 
source of values has changed (due to ideological shifts), or scientific 
knowledge has improved to give new insights about cause-effect relations 
(e.g., pollution is more harmful than we thought it was, or economic 
regulation reduces prices by less than we thought it did).
The normative theories based on aggregating numerical scores (or 
other continuous concepts of better and worse) do have a distinctly dif­
ferent set of predictions and normative conclusions than democratic the­
ory has. The former theories ascribe change to aggregate values, whereas 
the latter ascribe change to majority votes. Only if citizens are perfect 
altruists (citizens regard every other person as equal in importance to 
themselves) do the two theories produce the same conclusions, and in this 
case all votes are unanimous after people realize which policy produces 
the greatest overall net benefits. As normative theory, then, democratic 
theory implies that a change is better only if it is evaluated as preferred 
by a majority, whereas welfare economics concludes that a policy is bet­
ter if the gains to the winners numerically exceed the costs to the losers, 
even if there are many more losers (with tiny individual losses) than win­
ners (with very large individual gains). As a positive theory, democratic 
theory argues that most people must have benefitted, whereas welfare 
economics reaches no such conclusion. Likewise, democratic theory does 
not necessarily conclude that the net benefits were positive for the entire 
society, just that they were positive for most.
Relevance of Normative Theories
The shortcomings of normative theories as positive predictors of change 
are apparent, and will not be discussed at length. Suffice to say that wel­
fare economics as a positive theory of government is easily rejected for 
both pre-reform and post-reform regulatory policy. Regulation was not 
efficient before reform, and was not efficient afterwards. Likewise, the 
test of majority benefit is failed, for many policy reforms leave undone 
that which would have been economically beneficial. The remaining lec­
tures will explore this point in more detail for telecommunications, air­
line and environmental regulation. For now, this conclusion will simply 
be asserted, with reference to these lectures and to the large mountain of 





























































































The important point to note here is that, as of the beginning of the 
regulatory reform period in 1970, normative theories constituted pretty 
much the complete arsenal of analytical tools available to the scholar who 
sought to try to understand policy change. Indeed, the wide disparity be­
tween the teachings of normative economic theory and the reality of 
regulatory policy played a significant role in motivating new positive the­
ories of policy that were developed in parallel with the regulatory reform 
era. Nonetheless, normative economics and domestic politics certainly 
played a significant role in the process. A significant puzzle is how and 
why they did.
Positive Political Economics and Policy Change
The term positive political economics refers to the application of microe­
conomic (or rational actor) theory to the study of politics. The question it 
seeks to answer is what policies will emerge from a political system in 
which people behave in a manner that is analogous to their behaviour in 
economic settings (production and transaction).
The simplest imaginable microeconomic political theory is the analogue 
to perfect competition in economics, in which numerous buyers and 
sellers meet to make transactions, but in this case to buy and sell policies. 
One can imagine that each actor has a WTP for various policies, and that 
citizens with a positive WTP for an action will simply buy votes from 
people with negative WTPs until either the former have acquired an 
electoral majority or the latter remain in the majority after the WTPs of 
the former have been exhausted. On each dimension of policy, outcomes 
are determined in the same way as in the market in that the winning pol­
icy is the one that maximizes net WTP. Indeed, if society applies a una­
nimity rule for voting (rather than majority rule), bidding for policies 
guarantees “Pareto improving” policy change -  that is, all policy changes 
will leave everyone at least as well off as before the change.
For many obvious reasons, the “perfectly competitive republic” does 
not and can not exist. To begin, transacting votes is illegal, although not 
necessarily unknown, in all democratic societies. But this problem is less 
of an obstacle than it may at first appear to be, for citizens can always 
make “logrolls” whereby proponents of different policies agree to sup­
port the policies each advocates. Logrolling converts the policies them­
selves (e.g. the government budget) into the means for making transac­
tions. All that is ruled out is direct cash payments for votes.
Assuming voting transactions are possible, the process of making all 
the necessary bargains is obviously impractical. Not only would citizens 
spend most of their waking hours striking bargains for policy, they would 
face massive collective action and coordination problems. Public policy 
changes almost always have collective effects, simultaneously affecting a 




























































































fore bargaining could begin, would need to know the WTPs of all their 
members in order to begin negotiations to determine whether the positive 
or negative WTPs carried the day. Then, they would have to decide how 
to share the burden and benefit of the financial transfer from the winners 
to the losers.
Interest-Group Theory
The collective action problem in the hypothetical perfectly competitive 
republic has given rise to the first important contribution of positive po­
litical economic theory: the principle of organization of interests for ef­
fective political action. Because effective political organization is time- 
consuming and costly, a group must expect that the effect of organizing 
will be to produce policy benefits that exceed its organization costs. In 
order to mobilize for political action, a group faces two kinds of costs: a 
cost per member associated with forming the group and making a deci­
sion, and a fixed cost for gathering the information that the group needs 
to make an informed decision. The first can be written as f(N) and the 
second as F, and the total costs of an organization can be written as:
C = Nf(N) + F.
Generally, the first type of cost tends to be higher as a group becomes 
larger: as more and more people are added, it costs more per person to 
negotiate a common policy and to recruit an additional member. Mathe­
matically, this implies that f(N)>0.
To find joining a political organization worthwhile, a person must ex­
pect more costs than benefits. If B is the benefit of joining, which is 
derived from tlŵ polig^change the group will produce, on average a 
group member will join only if:
B > f(N) + F/N.
From this simple expression, several important conclusions can be 
derived.
First, a citizen must pass a minimum threshold of caring about a policy 
(that is, B must be sufficiently large) or the citizen will not perceive suf­
ficient motivation to participate in political action. Second, the difference 
between B and organization costs per person constitutes an adjusted WTP 
for political action. That is, after organizing, a citizen can contribute 
time, money and other resources to political action of the following 
amount:




























































































Thus, citizens who care more about a policy have more resources avail­
able to affect it, while citizens having less than a minimum interest will 
not be organized at all.
Third, if F is small compared to f(N) -  that is, it costs more to orga­
nize and to decide what to do than it does to gather the necessary infor­
mation for a decision -  small groups are advantaged over large ones. The 
reason is that, because f(N) is increasing in N, so too, is C/N increasing in 
N whenever F is small. Put another way, suppose that the aggregated eco­
nomic interest of two groups is the same. Then the smaller group has, 
first, a larger B per person, and second, a lower cost per person. Hence, 
the smaller group is more likely to be organized, and if both are orga­
nized, the smaller group will have a larger net WTP for effective politi­
cal participation. Consequently, in large, representative democracies, 
small groups with a high per capita stake in a policy should have greater 
influence over that policy than large groups with a small per capita stake, 
even if the total stake of the larger group is greater.
Applied to regulatory policy, the organization of interest theory pre­
dicts dominance by people who have the most per person to gain or lose 
from regulation. For the most part, this group consists of participants in 
regulated industries. A worker, manager, or major stockholder in a regu­
lated company depends on regulated activities for a substantial fraction (if 
not all) of income. Customers rarely spend very much of their income on 
any particular good or service, and generally industries have far more 
customers than employees and stockholders. Hence, the supply side is ad­
vantaged relative to the demand side in a regulated market.
In some cases, the greater political weight of supply interests can be 
partly offset. For example, a dispersed, atomistically competitive industry 
may sell to a very concentrated one comprised of large firms. One would 
not expect such a market to be regulated, but if it were regulated, the ad­
vantage would go to the buyers. In the United States, an example of this 
form of regulation was the control of natural gas prices at the wellhead. 
Natural gas is produced by a very large number of wells that are owned 
by a very large number of companies and even individuals, but it is sold 
primarily to a few pipelines and large utilities. The latter succeeded in 
obtaining economic regulation of natural gas in the 1950s, with the result 
being prices that were below market-clearing levels. This policy enabled 
gas utilities to set a lower price, resulting in higher profits and more ef­
fective competition against alternative sources of energy. Eventually, 
however, keeping prices suppressed by regulation reduced the incentive 
to drill wells, and a natural gas shortage ensued. Twenty-five years later, 
natural gas was deregulated to solve the shortage problem.
A more common circumstance is for some demand-side interests to 
have larger stakes in regulation than other consumers, leading to a situa­
tion in which some buyers are effectively organized and others are not. 




























































































prices and receive better service than an unorganized group. Two exam­
ples illustrate the point.
In transportation, cities with transport terminals (rail stations, airports) 
are already organized, but travellers generally are not. A single city has 
no particular interest in participating in setting detailed prices as long as 
the price proceeding affects all equally; however, if a transportation car­
rier seeks to cancel service to a community, the city will care deeply. In 
U.S. airline, rail and truck regulation before 1980, transport companies 
had to receive approval from regulators to abandon a terminal. Even if 
the service was woefully uneconomic, the regulators would respond to the 
protestations of local governments and refuse to grant permission. In­
stead, they would seek to raise prices to all customers to offset the losses 
from the uneconomic service.
In telecommunications, large bulk users of services can find telecom­
munications to be a substantial cost. In the U.S., although by-passing the 
telecommunications system for any purpose was generally banned, in 
1959 bulk users succeeded in obtaining permission to build private com­
munications systems. Soon thereafter, the monopoly telecommunications 
provider obtained permission to offer special low prices to bulk users to 
keep them on the network. In the 1960s, the focus was on “private lines” 
-  dedicated long distance links between cities, usually connecting the 
multiple facilities of a large corporation. Later, the telephone companies 
developed Centrex, a service whereby the multiple telephones in an office 
use a central office switch of the telephone company (rather than the 
customer’s own switch) to make calls within the office from one exten­
sion to another. Centrex lines were priced at about one-third of regular 
lines, a far greater discount than the cost difference. The telecommunica­
tions examples illustrate how large users obtained a better deal through 
regulation than smaller users, as predicted by the interest-group organi­
zation model.
In addition to demand-side groups, suppliers of the regulated entity 
also may be effectively organized to influence regulatory policy. Regu­
lated industries often buy inputs from other industries that sell all or most 
of their production to regulated firms. These industries may be even 
more concentrated, and have even greater stakes in regulatory policy, 
than the regulated firms. For example, the manufacturers of aircraft, 
railroad cars, telecommunications switches, and electric generation equip­
ment are all in very concentrated industries that deal only with regulated 
companies. Interest-group theory predicts that these companies will suc­
ceed in obtaining the official blessing of regulation to become special fa­
vorites of regulated firms. Not surprisingly, regulated companies in in­
frastructural industries often deal exclusively with national champion 
suppliers of major inputs, no matter how high the price and low the qual­
ity of the champion’s product. More subtly, these manufacturers also ben­
efit if the structure of regulation leads to excess capacity, such as by im­




























































































where it is not used. In the U.S. excess capacity was a widespread phe­
nomenon among regulated industries prior to reform.
The other important supplier interest that is likely to be effectively or­
ganized is union labor. A labor union, because it has already become ef­
fectively organized for another purpose, can easily extend the domain of 
its activities to include political activity. High on the list of priorities of a 
union in a regulated industry is the nature of regulatory policy. Like 
equipment suppliers, unions prefer excess capacity, plus above-market 
wages. Regulation gives unions an advantage, because firms cannot enter 
regulated markets without the approval of the regulators. Hence high 
union wages will not attract lower-wage firms (employing another union 
or non-union labor) if regulators cooperate. Thus, interest-group theory 
predicts that employees of regulated firms will receive higher wages than 
employees performing the same tasks in other companies, and that regula­
tors will assist unions by denying entry to lower-wage firms. These pre­
dictions, too, are consistent with U.S. experience in the era of regulatory 
reform, for in all cases deregulation has led to both entry by non-union 
firms and reductions in real wages for employees of the formerly regu­
lated firms.
The interest-group theory of regulatory policy is broadly consistent 
with many of the facts regarding regulation, but it is incomplete in sev­
eral important ways. First, by itself it does not predict that regulated in­
dustries will be particularly inefficient. All organized interests share the 
objective of having the regulated firm extract as much as it can from 
unorganized groups (as long as the amount extracted is not sufficient to 
motivate them to become organized). Thus, the theory predicts that regu­
lation will be used to redistribute income to organized groups, but not 
that regulated firms will have inefficient price structures or production. 
One would expect, for example, extensive use of elaborate pricing sys­
tems that contribute to efficiency while extracting substantial excess rev­
enues from customers (peak-load pricing, two-part tariffs, etc.). One 
would also expect efficiency in the design and operation of the system to 
minimize real resource costs (but not, of course, the income of people in 
the regulated firm or in dedicated supply industries). In practice, an im­
portant fact of deregulated industries is they were substantially reorga­
nized to improve their efficiency. Clear examples are the development of 
the “hub-spoke” route structure in airlines after deregulation, and the 
massive restructuring of AT&T’s manufacturing activities after divesti­
ture.
More significantly, interest-group theory does a poor job of predicting 
both economic deregulation and protectionist regulatory expansion. In 
most cases, deregulation has caused substantial financial losses in de­
regulated industries. Because the participants in the industry did seem to 
be the principal beneficiaries of regulation, the decision to deregulate can 
hardly be said to have been excessively influenced by them. Likewise, 




























































































ronmental regulation, even though they opposed the stringency of the 
policy forcefully. Subsequently, established firms did manage to obtain a 
system of regulation that favored them in comparison with newly estab­
lished production facilities, but in most cases these benefits have been 
small compared to the costs of complying with more stringent standards. 
At best, interest-group theory explains a bias in the regulatory process, 
but neither its initiation nor its demise.
The most important lesson from interest-group theory is to identify a 
potentially serious cost of regulation -  that the process is excessively 
sensitive to organized economic interests. This bias may have been a pur­
pose of a regulatory policy, and its elimination an objective of deregula­
tion. But it is also plausible that interest-group bias is sometimes accu­
rately perceived by political actors as a necessary evil of regulatory poli­
cies that are enacted for other reasons, or that the protectionist feature is 
designed into the institution to form a coalition of support between the 
regulated industry and others seeking regulation for an entirely different 
set of reasons. To illustrate, suppose that neither environmentalists nor 
labor unions could command a majority in the U.S. congress in the 1970s, 
and that unions wanted “plant closing” protection in a declining manufac­
turing sector while environmentalists wanted reduced emissions. The 
Democratic Party, including both groups within its coalition, could 
achieve both objectives somewhat imperfectly and incompletely by using 
emissions control regulation as a means to slow the restructuring of the 
economy. Only this half loaf for each could command a majority, and so, 
arguably, it was adopted.
The hypothesis of a labor-environment coalition is, of course, an ad 
hoc explanation. No reasons are apparent for this particular coalition to 
form, rather than others that also might form a majority to combine en­
vironmental regulation with some other policy objective. Interest groups 
need to command a majority in Congress to achieve legislative objectives, 
so the question remains how these majorities are formed, and why some 
groups are included but others are not. Labor unions surely were not part 
of the coalition adopting economic deregulation. Why did they lose in one 
field but win in another during the same period? And, if the la- 
bor/environmental coalition explains the regulatory policy of the 1970- 
1990 period, why, simultaneously, did the same coalition fail to stop free 
trade, and especially the Canada-U.S. Free Trade Agreement and, in 
1991, the “fast track” process for extending the free trade zone to Mex­
ico? Quite obviously, the coalition account leaves much to be explained. 
Nonetheless, this conjectural explanation illustrates how the coalitional 
version of interest-group theory can provide a richer model of the ori­




























































































Pathologies of Majority Rule
If, as is usually the case, no single interest (or point of view) commands a 
majority concerning regulatory policy, an extremely important question 
is how winning policy coalitions form to initiate and maintain policies. 
The transactional arguments based on the principle of willingness-to-pay 
assume that the winning policy is the one that maximizes net WTP. The 
key assumption of this theory is that the transactional approach to WTP 
maximization has a unique, stable outcome -  an equilibrium policy that 
will not change unless the underlying preferences (WTPs) of citizens 
change.
Unfortunately, the assumption that an equilibrium exists in such a de­
cision-making process is untenable. Kenneth Arrow’s Nobel Prize in eco­
nomics was awarded in part for his path-breaking treatise, Social Choice 
and Individual Values. In this work, Arrow proved the “Impossibility 
Theorem” -  that unless citizens have the same preferences, no social de­
cision process can simultaneously exhibit a few simple (and desirable) 
properties, including economic efficiency, a unique, stable equilibrium, 
and the absence of a dictator. Thus, majority rule voting, in particular, is 
unstable -  indeed, chaotic, in that a society can move from literally any 
technically feasible policy to another by a sequence of majority-rule 
votes. Applied to coalition formation, the implications of this work are 
that many coalitions can emerge and that if one does emerge, it will be 
unstable. Hence, policy change not only cannot be predicted from knowl­
edge of the strength of interest groups, but it is random.
The chaos of social choice theory is obviously incorrect as a prediction 
about public policy, for no society -  not even nations with unstable, per­
petually changing governments -  displays rapid, random policy shifts. 
But stability in real-world policy does not disprove the theory. Chaos 
theory is based on the assumption that all decisions are made by majority 
rule in a very simple voting process in which anyone can propose any 
measure at any time. In practice, all real-world voting systems are far 
more complicated than this. Indeed, legislatures typically have very 
complex systems of rules governing who can speak, when measures can 
be introduced and amended, and how the agenda of a session will unfold. 
Social choice theory provides an explanation for why the simple concept 
of voting requires so complex an institutional structure. In particular, 
institutional complexity can make policy more stable -  institutions are, 
among other things, a means for overcoming the chaos of unstructured 
collective decision making.
A simple example drawn from the procedures of the U.S. congress 
(and most other legislatures) illustrates the point. Suppose a legislative 
body is considering a bill (B). Before debate starts, the legislature knows 
that one of its members will attempt to change the bill by proposing an 
amendment (A). Indeed, in the congress, members must inform the Rules 




























































































gins. Assume that S refers to the status quo, prior to any action being 
taken by the legislature. Thus, the legislature is choosing among B, A, 
and S. Finally, assume that the legislature divides into three groups of 
equal size. One group prefers the amended bill (A), but would rather 
have the original bill (B) than keep the status quo (S). The second group 
prefers B to S, but prefers S to A. The last group wants to retain S, but 
prefers A to B. These preferences can be represented as follows, where 




Notice that in a simple majority vote, A defeats B by a vote of two to one; 
B defeats S by a similar vote; and S defeats A by the same margin; there­
fore, these alternatives illustrate the famous Condorcet paradox of in­
transitivity in majority-rule voting among individuals having transitive 
preferences. In a legislature without any rules other than majority domi­
nance, policy would be chaotic, because each of these policies could be 
defeated by one of the others. Alternative B would be adopted by defeat­
ing the status quo; then A would be introduced and would defeat B; and 
then S would be reintroduced, defeating A.
In nearly all legislatures, the chaotic circumstance described above 
could not occur because of the agenda rule of the decision-making body. 
Specifically, in any legislative debate, the last vote taken is almost always 
a contest between the bill as amended versus the status quo. That is, rather 
than having a vote after each measure is proposed, an original proposal is 
first “perfected” by amendment during debate, and then the ultimate de­
cision is whether the perfected (amended) proposal is regarded as supe­
rior to the status quo by a majority. Moreover, once defeated, a measure 
cannot be reintroduced during the same session of the legislature. In the 
preceding example, these rules produce the following agenda:
Step 1: Vote between B and A
Step 2: Vote between S and the winner of B against A.
In this sequence of votes, A defeats B by a vote of two to one, but S de­
feats A (the amended bill) as well, so the status quo is preserved.
A second stability-enhancing feature of almost all legislatures is the 
committee structure. For example, in the U.S. congress (both House and 
Senate) and the European Parliament, all bills are referred to a commit­
tee. Except under unusual circumstances, the entire chamber of the legis­
lature will not consider a measure until the committee issues its “report” 
-  that is, reports a measure to the entire chamber which has received ma­
jority support in the committee. Thus, the committee has a “gatekeeper” 




























































































by the entire body. In addition, in the U.S. congress committees are fur­
ther advantaged in that the chair of the committee is normally accorded 
the right to respond first to any amendment, and immediately to propose 
a further amendment to any amendment. Finally, in the U.S., with two 
equal legislative bodies, the committee responsible for a measure usually 
is appointed to the “conference committee” of the two chambers, which 
resolves differences in the measures passed in each body. No measure is 
reported from the conference committee unless a majority from each 
chamber approves, giving the original committee further assurance that 
nothing will be enacted unless it commands a majority on the committee.
Status Quo Bias
The effect of committee structure is to bias policy in favor of the status 
quo. A change in policy must command not only a majority in the entire 
body, but a majority in committee as well. If the committee is not essen­
tially a mirror of the entire body, the requirement for satisfying two ma­
jorities will be a more difficult hurdle than satisfying only a majority of 
the entire chamber. Normal practice is to appoint committees that are not 
fully representative of the entire legislative body. Instead, parties nor­
mally appoint their representatives on committees, and they can be ex­
pected to do so with an eye towards the policy interests of their members. 
A legislator from a district that cares a great deal about one particular 
policy will normally find its representative appointed to the correspond­
ing committee, for by doing so that member’s party is assisting its own 
prospects for holding the seat in the next election. As a result, a commit­
tee tends to be populated by representatives whose constituents are un­
usually interested in the committee’s policy jurisdiction: e.g., farm consti­
tuencies tend to be over-represented on the agriculture committee. The 
effect is to give representatives whose constituents care most about a pol­
icy an institutionalized veto over policy changes.
The implications of these observations for regulatory policy are as 
follows. First, like all policies, regulatory policy ought to be difficult to 
change through writing new legislation. Moreover, if regulatory agencies 
manage to change policy without violating their old statutory empower­
ment from the legislature, passing new legislation to re-establish the old 
status quo will also be difficult, if not impossible. Second, if regulatory 
policy was created in part to provide benefits to the regulated industry, 
the committee structure of the legislature can be expected to have institu­
tionalized industry’s interest in preserving the policy. If the preferences 
of other interests change so that regulation can no longer command a 
majority, it may still persist because the legislative committee exercises its 
gatekeeping veto to prevent reform from being considered by the entire 
body. Third, if the entire body cares enough about the preceding state of 




























































































committee’s gatekeeping function (such as by transferring jurisdiction to 
another committee).
The preceding argument can easily be illustrated by a simple diagram. 
Suppose policy is the choice of a position on a line (such as, for example, 
the allowable emissions from an automobile), as in Figure 1.1. Let L rep­
resent the best policy choice from the perspective of the entire legislature, 
C be the best policy choice from the perspective of the committee, and A 
be the best policy choice from the agency’s perspective. Finally, let S rep­
resent the status quo ante in which emissions are not controlled. (Techni­
cally, both L and C represent the position of the median voter in each 
group.) Assume that each political actor prefers a policy as near as pos­
sible to the best possible policy.
Figure 1.1: Policy Relationships between Agencies 
and the Legislature
S L C A
The relative positions of the actors reflect the view that committee mem­
bers tend to be advocates of the policy in their jurisdiction, and that 
agencies, because they do not personally face conflicts between their po­
licies and other policies, tend to be even more favorably disposed to their 
policy than the committee. In the situation depicted in Figure 1.1, the 
committee would propose C to the legislature. Depending on the rules of 
the legislature, the bill that was enacted would lie somewhere between C 
and L. For example, the legislature might amend C by substituting L. 
Alternatively, the committee might be able to force a simple yes-no vote 
on C without amendment. Because C is preferred to S by the floor (C is 
closer to L), C would then pass. In the former case, if the agency in fact 
implements A, the committee will not act to “correct” the agency’s policy, 
because the committee prefers A to L. In the latter case, because the legis­
lature enacts the committee’s most preferred policy, the committee will 
try to correct an agency that implements A. Thus, by giving committees 
more power, the legislature in this case actually will obtain a policy out­
come nearer to its preferred one! This case is not general, however, for it 
depends on the particular assumptions about the positions of S, L, C and 
A.
Finally, suppose that the position of the legislature’s optimum changes. 
If the actual policy outcome is not the old L, but something nearer C, the 
shift in L will have no effect. If L moves closer to S (the legislature wants 
to relax the standards), the committee will simply not report a new bill. If 
L shifts towards C, the committee will report a new bill only if the new 
position of L is nearer to C than to the current policy. If the legislature 




























































































is enacted, no change in L is likely to result in new legislation unless, of 
course, the legislature decides to reorganize itself in order to disenfran­
chise the committee.
The significance of this example is that it illustrates an important char­
acteristic of the structure of decision making. Creating powerful, special­
ized committees and implementing agencies does help to stabilize policy, 
but it does so by making policy less responsive to the democratic process. 
The task of legislatures is to create a structure that finds a balance be­
tween the chaotic implications of responsiveness and the undemocratic 
implications of structure-induced stability.
Incomplete Information
Legislative committees, as well as implementing agencies, cope with an­
other serious problem of policy making: the informational requirements 
of devising a good policy. In the regulatory field, reasonably effective 
policy requires detailed knowledge about the technology and economics 
of regulated companies. Part of the job of a legislative committee and an 
implementing bureaucracy is to gather the information necessary for ra­
tional public policy. But the need for information raises a more profound 
problem for collective decision-making processes. The theoretical argu­
ments developed thusfar have assumed that people who make policy deci­
sions are relatively well informed. Obviously, if agencies and committees 
have the task of becoming informed as part of the process of making de­
cisions, it necessarily must be the case that neither voters nor the remain­
ing members of the legislature are sufficiently well informed to make 
these policy choices on their own. Indeed, the problem is even worse than 
this. In majority-rule voting within large bodies, a single vote is unlikely 
to be decisive. Consequently, a single voter has very little incentive to put 
forth time, effort and money to become informed before casting a vote. 
Mathematically, if P is the probability that a single vote will be decisive, 
B is the benefit of an informed vote, and C is the cost of becoming in­
formed, then a voter will bear the costs of information only if the bene­
fits exceed the costs:
P*B>C.
If the number of people casting votes is more than a few, P is a very 
tiny number. Even for the U.S. Senate, which contains 100 members, P is 
very small -  far less than .01 -  whereas for the entire electorate in even a 
small nation, a single voter’s P is essentially zero. This means that voters 
have essentially no incentive to be informed about policy, or even about 
the policies advocated by their representative, and that likewise represen­
tatives have little incentive to be informed, in part because their con­
stituents will not be likely to know whether they cast informed votes. The 




























































































little power, rational behaviour by a voter is to make little or no invest­
ment in information about how to vote.
Committees overcome the rational ignorance problem because they 
have sufficiently few members that each vote is likely to be important a 
reasonably high fraction of the time. Thus, members of committees have 
an incentive to collect information about the policies in their jurisdiction. 
But the superior information possessed by committee members (and by 
agencies that implement policies) creates the problem of “hidden action” 
arising from “hidden information”. That is, agencies and committees can 
withhold information from others, and to some extent take policy actions 
that are not observed by others, to pursue their own objectives -  objec­
tives that may not be consistent with the preferences of either other mem­
bers of the legislature or their own constituents.
One consequence of rational ignorance is that after legislation is passed, 
the policy that is implemented can depart from the expectations and in­
tentions of the voters and legislators who supported it without their even 
knowing the change has taken place. And, if committees are unrepresen­
tative in that they are composed of members whose constituents have the 
greatest personal stake in a policy, the direction of bias will be toward the 
interests of these preference outliers.
The most important implication of the preceding argument is that in­
formation imperfections bias policy in favor of organized interests, for 
the latter have organized in part to collect the information necessary to 
advance their preferred policies The structure of a legislature gives 
committees the advantage of superior information. Most likely, the 
committee will offset to some extent the informational advantages of or­
ganized interests because unorganized constituents will carry some weight 
in the committee’s own policy preferences. But the committee will still 
use its informational advantage over voters and the rest of the legislature 
to produce a policy that is closer to its own preferences than would arise 
if everyone were perfectly informed.
Administrative Procedures and Political Control
The primary weapon available to legislatures in controlling hidden in­
formation and hidden action is to specify the informational requirements 
of a policy decision by an implementing agency. The means of specifying 
informational requirements is administrative law: the formal statement of 
the powers of an agency and the procedures it must use to implement a 
policy.
The use of administrative law to control policy is made most apparent 
by a specific example: the regulation of potentially hazardous chemicals. 
In most advanced societies, one category of chemicals -  pharmaceuticals -  
is regulated especially stringently. In the United States, the statute guiding 
the Food and Drug Administration requires that a company seeking to 




























































































cording to rigorous scientific testing standards. Consequently, obtaining a 
license for a new drug is expensive and time consuming, so that relatively 
few new drug discoveries proceed through the testing and licensing pro­
cess. By contrast, hazardous chemicals that are used in industrial pro­
cesses are regulated by very different procedures. In the United States, 
the regulator -  the Environmental Protection Agency -  bears the burden 
of proving that a chemical is unsafe (compared to the alternatives), and 
must do so within a few months after a company reports its intention to 
market it. The budget of the EPA is only sufficient for it to examine 
closely a handful of chemicals per year. The rest proceed to market with­
out serious regulatory scrutiny. Obviously, the latter process gives a 
strong informational advantage to inventors of new chemicals, whereas 
the former not only eliminates the informational advantage, but forces 
inventors to gather more information about a new drug than they would 
otherwise find useful for making a decision about whether to market it. 
This advantages the owner of an old dmg that might be replaced by a new 
one. It extends the time that it takes to enter the market successfully, and 
before entry occurs provides information to the owner of the old drug 
about the exact nature of the competitive threat.
Whether strict or lax rules for introducing dangerous chemicals are 
more desirable is not the point of the preceding example. Instead, it illus­
trates how procedures can allocate advantages among parties affected by a 
regulatory decision. In the United States, the legislation establishing a 
regulatory policy normally contains detailed instructions to the agency 
about how it must go about its business: what data it must collect, and 
what standards and burdens of proof it must apply. In addition, agency 
procedures are also governed by the Administrative Procedures Act, 
which specifies that agencies must provide a rational explanation for their 
actions, based on the evidence submitted to them by interested parties and 
their own staffs. Whether agencies have followed these procedures is then 
subject to judicial review. If a party affected by an agency does not re­
ceive a favorable decision, it can appeal the decision to the courts, claim­
ing that the agency did not follow its legislative instructions with respect 
to policy objectives and procedures.
The legislature can use procedural requirements to favor an interest 
that is not informationally advantaged. For example, an environmental or 
consumer protection organization may be knowledgable about the effects 
of a hazard on its members, but may not be knowledgable about the costs 
and performance of technical solutions to the problem of reducing expo­
sure to the hazard. If the act regulating the hazardous activity places the 
burden of proof on environmentalists to show that a control is worth its 
cost, the process will favor the producer of the hazard, who will possess 
“hidden information” that it can use strategically to bias the policy out­
come. If, however, the burden of proof is on the producer to show that a 




























































































producer will have to reveal more of its private information to influence 
the outcome.
One potential explanation for regulatory policy change lies in the role 
of procedures in shaping outcomes. If new private information is discov­
ered, it will be fed into the regulatory process only if it is beneficial to its 
discoverer. New public information will be fed into the process only if it 
adds strength to the position of one of the parties represented in the pro­
cess. For example, the “ideas” account of regulatory policy change can be 
given more concrete explanatory power when interpreted through the bi­
ases inherent in administrative decision processes. New findings by 
economists about the effects of regulation can influence policy only if two 
conditions hold. First, the economic effects of regulation must be part of 
the information on which decisions must be based according to the 
statutes delegating authority to an agency. Second, some parties to an 
agency decision regard the new information as useful to them in advocat­
ing their preferred policy change. These parties can be either organized 
interests that participate in agency deliberations, or an internal staff that 
is charged with generating information that organized interests would not 
necessarily produce on their own. If these conditions are satisfied, regula­
tory policy can change without any change in the preferences of the rele­
vant political actors in the legislature or the interests that are active par­
ticipants in the political and administrative processes associated with regu­
latory policy.
Political Entrepreneurs
Thusfar, the analysis of regulatory policy change has focused almost en­
tirely on the influence of organized interests. The danger in such a focus 
is that it is easy to interpret interest-group theory as encompassing all of 
political activity, rather than as simply a source of bias in outcomes. Ra­
tional choice theory predicts that organized interests will have greater 
weight than unorganized interests, but it does not predict that all sources 
of political preferences outside of political organizations will be accorded 
zero weight. Because organizations overcome rational ignorance and co­
ordination problems for their members, they will cause voters to give 
relatively more weight to aspects of their political preferences that are 
represented by politically relevant organizations. But this does not imply 
that other concerns do not influence behaviour. Thus, if voters’ prefer­
ences about a policy shift, and if to some extent decisions about voting 
and other forms of political participation are based on this policy, elected 
representatives are likely to shift their preferences in the same direction. 
But policy will not necessarily shift as well, due to the status quo bias in 
political institutions. Only if the status quo bias is overcome will any shift 
in desired policy affect actual policy outcomes, whether the source of the 




























































































The role of the political entrepreneur is to orchestrate the effective 
representation of hitherto less powerful interests and to find a way to 
achieve policy change on their behalf. The theory of political organiza­
tion does not closely examine the origins of an interest group. Essentially, 
people of like mind find each other and become organized, perhaps facili­
tated by the presence of other organizations that were created for another 
purpose, such as a company, a union, a church, or an outdoor recreation 
club. The members then share the cost of the organization, and benefit 
from the change in policy that it brings about. But this mechanism is not 
the only way to mobilize citizens of like interest. The other is for a politi­
cal official to undertake the effort and cost of mobilization: gathering 
data about a policy, interpreting it for an otherwise unorganized group, 
communicating the message effectively, and then benefitting from indi­
vidual decisions by group members to support the politician. Thus, one 
aspect of political entrepreneurship is to recognize an unsatisfied, un­
mobilized political preference, and to find a way to induce people who 
hold that preference to take political action on the basis of it. Of course, 
the latter will not occur unless the as-yet unfocused preference is poten­
tially strong enough to push aside some people’s other motives for politi­
cal action.
Once the new group is mobilized, the political entrepreneur must solve 
the institutional problem of obtaining a change in policy that is favorable 
to this constituency. Applying chaos theory, the political entrepreneur 
holds one advantage -  there must be a way to reach any policy change 
from the status quo. The obstacle is the status quo bias in the political 
system. Somehow the political entrepreneur must overcome this bias.
The easy way to upset the status quo is to make the issue so important 
to other politicians that they are forced to go along. Often chief execu­
tives -  a president or a prime minister -  obtain their objectives this way 
by winning an overwhelming election on the basis of some new issues.
Even if these politicians do not command a solid majority in the legisla­
ture, some of their opponents go along with their proposals out of fear of 
electoral reprisals if they do not. Thus, regulatory policy might change 
because a political leader simply forces it from a strong base of popular 
support.
The more difficult way to upset the status quo is to find a loophole in 
the procedures of the political system that creates the status quo bias. In 
this circumstance, the entrepreneur does not have sufficient political 
power to command a legislative majority by simply demanding it. In­
stead, the entrepreneur must find a way within the existing institutional 
structure to take advantage of the fundamental instability of the status . 
quo. Two examples illustrate the point. First, a president, with superior \ 
knowledge about the policy proclivities of nominees for a regulatory 
agency, may succeed in appointing officials who will shift policy in a way /-JO 
that the oversight committee cannot correct, essentially taking advantage 
of an arrangement of preferences as depicted in Figure 1.1 that is favor-
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able to successful “hidden action” by the agency. Second, a legislator may 
find a way to “poach” on the jurisdiction of another committee, by-pass­
ing the latter’s gatekeeping power, or may succeed in obtaining some new 
appointments to a committee with hidden preferences that are inconsistent 
with the committee’s prior policies.
Political entrepreneurship interacts with interest-group analysis in still 
another interesting way. In the preceding account, the political en­
trepreneur creates and maintains the interest group by being the instru­
ment for mobilizing it. Alternatively, a change in policy can cause the 
heretofore unorganized interest to become organized. If a policy change 
substantially increases the per capita stakes of the winners, they may then 
have sufficient incentive to mobilize themselves -  to pay their own orga­
nization and political participation costs -  to defend the new status quo. 
This ex post organization occurs when the identity of the actual winners is 
sufficiently uncertain before the policy change to prevent ex ante mobi-
^  lization in favor of reform. For example, the people who will hold stock 
and be employed in firms that will profit from reform may face a small 
ex ante probability of being the beneficiaries of change because a large 
number of firms, stockholders and employees may prove to be the even­
tual winners. After the change this uncertainty is resolved, and the benefit 
of winning becomes concentrated in the ex post winners rather than dif­
fused over a larger number of ex ante potential winners. The ex post 
resolution of the uncertainty can therefore cause the beneficiaries to cross 
over the threshold for becoming politically organized, where expected 
benefits from organized participation exceed the expected costs.
A political entrepreneur has an obvious incentive to favor policy 
changes that create their own support constituency ex post. If a policy 
change creates an organized support constituency, the political en­
trepreneur is in a position to capture support -  votes, volunteers, contri­
butions -  from the new group, whereas if no ex post organization 
emerges, the political entrepreneur must bear the costs of mobilizing the 
continued support of the beneficiaries.
A source of policy change that is very similar to a political en­
trepreneur can be a judicial official who, in reviewing an agency deci­
sion, simply alters policy in a way that other political actors cannot effec­
tively counteract. Referring back to Figure 1.1, if the legislature enacts 
policy L, but the court instructs the agency to implement another policy 
nearer C, both the agency and the oversight committee will gladly com­
ply, and the legislative body as a whole will never get the opportunity to 
re-establish L by passing a law that reverses the court’s decision. Of 
course, this result is far more likely to arise if the court’s policy change 
causes the mobilization of a group that receives benefits from the change. 
In this case, the underlying set of political forces acting on the policy 
preferences of legislators will shift in favor of the policy change, thereby 
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In like fashion, a bureaucratic official can secure a permanent policy 
change that is inconsistent with the intent of a statute; however, to do so, 
the bureaucratic official must succeed by first, taking action without po­
litical overseers knowing the decision is about to be made (otherwise, 
they can intervene to stop the action before its support group mobilizes), 
and second, obtaining approval for the change during the process of ju­
dicial review. One property of U.S. administrative law is that it serves to 
protect against both eventualities by requiring public notice of intended 
policy changes (with a period for comment and reconsideration) and by 
giving courts detailed standards for reviewing agency decisions. Of 
course, courts can still go along with the non-complying agency.
In the European Economic Community, the European Parliament plays 
a role that is similar to the role of the courts in the U.S. in that Commis­
sion and Council decisions are reported to the Parliament for review and 
possible amendment or disapproval. The advantage of this system is that it 
does not rely on a third party (the judiciary) to protect against policy de­
cisions that are inconsistent with the policy preferences of the legislature. 
The disadvantage is that as government becomes more complicated, par­
liamentary review of executive decisions and proposals can become ex­
tremely time-consuming, causing some policy decisions to be reviewed 
only in a cursory way, or to be reviewed only by a committee of the leg­
islature. Because committees can be expected generally to be unrepresen­
tative of the entire chamber, the latter procedure enables committees and 
bureaucracies to work together to produce policies that, with full knowl­
edge, the legislature would block.
The entering wedges for political entrepreneurship are informational 
imperfections in the political system and the fundamental instability of 
majority rule decision making. A public official can make use of superior 
information about some aspect of policy or about the decision-making 
process to cause policy to change. For the policy to stick, it must be with­
in certain boundaries determined by the preferences of citizens, legisla­
tors, and other government officials. Within limits, policies can be 
changed without the possibility for effective response because of the status 
quo bias. These limits, in turn, can be altered by political entrepreneur- 
ship directed at voters, whereby the entrepreneur bears the costs of giv­
ing effective political voice to a previously unorganized group.
Conclusions
Rational actor theory supports a very complex view of policy change, 
admitting a variety of avenues for reform. Regulatory policy is almost 
always a complex enterprise, requiring the implicit consent of numerous 
government officials and a substantial effort in collecting and evaluating 
arcane information. Thus, the complexity of regulatory policy adds to the 




























































































Obviously, regulatory reform could arise from a shift in preferences 
or a change in the information base of policy. Rational actor theory, by 
focusing on how these sources of change work their way through the po­
litical process, gives added concreteness to both ideological and informa­
tional explanations of change. In particular, these shifts need not cause 
policy to change if political institutions and preferences are organized in a 
way that protects the status quo against such shifts. By the same line of 
reasoning, neither changed preferences nor changed information is a nec­
essary condition for durable policy change.
The somewhat unsatisfying conclusion is that the theoretical ideas 
available to us do not make strong, robust predictions about how, when 
and in what direction policy will change. Instead, theory serves more to 
structure the information about the sequence of events surrounding a 
policy change. Only detailed empirical investigation of a regulatory pol­
icy -  its economic consequences and the institutional structure in which it 
was created and implemented -  can ultimately shed much light on its 
evolution. The reforms of the 1970-90 era might have arisen for quite 
different reasons, connected only by similarities in how the status quo 
bias was overcome, not in any commonality of purpose or base of politi­
cal support.
The approach to explaining policy change that has been outlined here 
has recently come to be called “The New Institutionalism”. The term 
refers to a scholarly approach early in the 20th Century which viewed 
every facet of social behaviour as sui generis, depending on the detailed 
facts of the issue at hand. The search for a unifying theory was regarded 
as fruitless. In economics, institutionalism was associated with the view 
that every industry had to be studied separately, that differences in tech­
nology, resources and tastes made a useful general microeconomic theory 
of market processes infeasible. In political science, institutionalism took 
the view that every issue of public policy had its own special politics, and 
that cultural and historical differences made generalizations across nations 
in even a single policy area unfruitful.
The new institutionalism is obviously not compatible with the old, for 
it is based on a coherent model of political decision making that cuts 
across all policies and cultures: the rational pursuit of policy objectives by 
competing political actors with conflicting purposes. Its commonality 
with the old is that it does take institutions seriously. In the new institu­
tionalism, institutions allocate decision power and specify decision rules, 
and so define the feasible range of policy change. Thus, to explain policy 
change one must mediate the general theory of preference-based choices 
through the special features of the institutions in which policy decisions 
are made.
In the regulatory policy domain, the new institutionalism provides a 
means for integrating numerous other theories of policy reform, some of 
which are not even based on rational choice theory. The most important 




























































































choice of processes as a means of stabilizing policy and assuring that it 
will have a particular orientation -  or bias. Presumably political actors 
know that institutions create decisional biases, and that they may face an 
impossible task in trying to re-establish their policy objectives if actual 
policy drifts from their intentions. Thus, decisions about policy structures 
and processes embody protections against policy drift, and contain infor­
mation about the intent of those who changed a policy. To infer the rea­
sons for a policy change, then, it is perhaps more important to examine 
the process by which the new policy is to be implemented than to read the 






















































































































































































Lecture #2 -  Telecommunications Policy
Policy for traditional public utilities -  natural gas, telecommunications, 
electricity, pipelines, water -  is evolving rapidly, on somewhat divergent 
paths, throughout the world. Privatization and deregulation of at least 
some utility industries are being pursued in a surprisingly large number 
of countries outside of the OECD, including some very small nations 
(New Zealand) and some developing states (Mexico). A generation ago, 
most would have regarded such developments as unthinkable, for every­
where utilities were regarded as natural monopolies.
In the U.S., no utility industry has been deregulated, but liberalization 
has taken place in all except water systems, where the massive subsidiza­
tion of water for agriculture has thusfar prevented a more economically 
rational system of water pricing and allocation. The most important re­
forms are in electricity and telecommunications regulation. In the 
former, although electric utilities still own most electric generation ca­
pacity, most new generation investment now is undertaken outside of the 
regulated utility structure, and brisk contract and spot markets have de­
veloped for the delivery of power to retail utilities and large industrial 
consumers. In telecommunications, basic access to the system and other 
“local” services (within a metropolitan area) have been separated from 
national services and manufacturing, and much of the industry has been 
deregulated.
This essay focuses on telecommunications, although the circumstances 
in this industry are in some ways similar to conditions in other utilities. 
The focus is on telecommunications because of its unusual rates of growth 
and technological progress, and because the telecommunications system is 
being used for an ever-widening array of services. Indeed, so many in­
dustries now either provide novel services or devices that use the net­
work, or depend on it in their own business, that telecommunications is 
widely regarded as one industry that no nation can permit to be seriously 
inefficient. Consequently, it is somewhat surprising that so many nations 
have taken the risk of radically redesigning the structure of the industry 
and its policies.
Until the 1970s, telecommunications was widely thought to be most ef­
ficiently provided by a single, ubiquitous national carrier who owned or 
controlled all aspects of the network (including the equipment attached to 
it). Moreover, for national security reasons it was thought essential to 



























































































emment officials still hold this view, making telecommunications liberal­
ization highly controversial.
Nevertheless, in the post-War era, the commitment to a single national 
telecommunications system has weakened almost everywhere, and has all 
but disappeared in a few countries. However, among even large, econom­
ically advanced nations, substantial differences have emerged regarding 
the direction of reform. At one extreme, with the United States, the 
United Kingdom and to a lesser extent Japan as the principal examples, 
are nations that strive to come as close as possible to eliminating mono­
poly entirely, even with respect to basic access to the national network. In 
these countries, policy has permitted competitive entry into almost every 
nook and cranny of the industry, and price regulation is becoming more 
relaxed as greater reliance is placed on competition to control prices and 
profits. At the other extreme, represented by France, Germany and most 
other European nations, policy seeks to continue to protect the core net­
work infrastructure as a monopoly. In these countries, reform consists of 
permitting competition at the periphery: customer equipment (other than 
the first telephone) and new information services, with the prices, profit 
and technical evolution of the network far more heavily controlled by 
government regulation or even nationalized operation.
These two approaches reflect two fundamentally different ways of 
thinking about the telecommunications industry, and other utilities. One 
paradigmatic view -  the one that dominated policy until the recent era of 
reform -  is the “humming system” view as exemplified by the engineer­
ing approach to network design. All network industries, including 
telecommunications, have inherent economies of scale. The source of 
these economies is in the flexibility in traffic flow that arises in any net­
work. The greater is the interconnectedness of the system, the smaller is 
the network capacity that is required to handle any given pattern of use. 
Network economies are even more important when the demands placed 
on the system occur randomly, so that the system has to be “overde­
signed” to cope with the unusual circumstance in which an especially 
heavy load is placed on it. Network interconnectedness minimizes the in­
cremental cost of protecting against system failure when extreme de­
mands arise.
The second conceptual model of networks emphasizes flexibility and 
diversity. For example, information services using other technologies 
(broadcasting, publications) exhibit extensive product differentiation, and 
substantial entry and exit by suppliers. In part, this diversity arises from 
the variety of different uses to which customers put information services. 
Moreover, these uses change radically as tastes and production technolo­
gies in information-using industries change. In addition, the underlying 
technology of telecommunications is itself rapidly evolving, gaining the 
capability to perform more and more functions. Meanwhile, the hardware 
costs of telecommunications are falling, and constitute a declining share 




























































































becoming less important, whereas knowledge of customer requirements, 
effective marketing, and transfer of technical information among tech­
nologists, managers and customers are becoming more valuable. These 
latter attributes of an information-services provider require organiza­
tional flexibility and favor a variety of specialized organizations. Organi­
zational diseconomies of scale in very large monopoly telecommunica­
tions carriers, therefore, may swamp the economies of scale in the net­
work.
In the United States, the second vision of the industry has certainly 
been more influential since the late 1960s than before, or than it has been 
in other nations. Thus, it seems superficially plausible that telecommuni­
cations reform can be traced to the development of an ideological com­
mitment to competitive, unregulated markets, or the “new idea” of the 
second view of the industry. Unfortunately, history belies this interpreta­
tion. The structure of the telecommunications industry has been contro­
versial since its birth with the deployment of the first commercial tele­
graph systems early in the Nineteenth Century. Moreover, the events that 
caused reform in the U.S. to go substantially beyond reforms in Europe 
were something of a fluke. The U.S. did not adopt its current policy be­
cause a president and/or a congress formally decided to pursue it. Instead, 
a series of incremental reforms, some of which were unexpected and to 
some degree politically unsupported, were imposed on the system. Advo­
cates of the status quo ante could not reverse these changes, although on 
several occasions they tried and came quite close.
Historical Roots
Since the industry began, numerous businesses in the U.S. have sought to 
participate in the telecommunications industry. Shortly after Marconi 
built the first commercial telegraph link in the United States, competition 
developed to connect the rest of the country to telegraph service. During 
more quiescent times, the competitors would merge or recognize geo­
graphic market segmentation, but in other periods they would compete 
fiercely.
Early Structural Controversies
In the mid-1870s, two different versions of a telephone were developed 
and patented by different companies, Bell Telephone and Western Union, 
the dominant telegraph firm. Rather than engage in protracted competi­
tion and patent infringement suits, the two companies reached a singularly 
one-sided accord. Bell would develop the telephone as a monopoly, and 
Western Union would retain a near monopoly in the telegraph, with nei­
ther encroaching on the business of the other. Twenty years later, this ar­




























































































acquired by Bell, which renamed itself the American Telephone and 
Telegraph System.
Bell’s monopoly in telephones remained only as long as its patents were 
in force. By the mid-1890s, other companies began to enter the local tele­
phone business, competing directly with the local Bell System. Bell sought 
to thwart this entry by refusing to interconnect with its competitors -  that 
is, a customer of a non-Bell company could neither call or be called by a 
Bell customer. But denial of interconnection did not work, and by the 
turn of the century Bell’s nationwide market share was below fifty per­
cent. In many cities, customers had their choice of telephone companies, 
and where competition existed, prices were lower.
Early in the Twentieth Century, Bell succeeded in developing a sub­
stantially improved long distance technology, which was protected by its 
patents. Customers wanted better long distance service, but it was made 
available only to subscribers of a Bell local system. The other companies 
counterattacked by interconnecting with each other, but the advantage of 
Bell in long distance could not be overcome. Customers began to switch 
to AT&T service, and Bell began a rapid move to acquire as many local 
competitors as possible.
The AT&T acquisition wave led to the first major antitrust interven­
tions against the company, one seeking divestiture of newly acquired 
Western Union to preserve competition in telegraphy, and the other re­
sponding to the ongoing demise of local competition. The government 
succeeded in the first attempt, and Western Union was again made an in­
dependent company -  a largely meaningless gesture in the new technolog­
ical world created by telephony. With respect to the second, negotiations 
between AT&T and the federal government led to a settlement in 1913, 
the Kingsbury Agreement, that enshrined the “humming system” view of 
telephony. Bell agreed to allow itself to be regulated, and not to acquire 
noncompetitive local systems. It also agreed to let other local telephone 
companies interconnect to its long distance system. In return, Bell was 
allowed to keep its long distance monopoly and to acquire monopoly sta­
tus in areas where it already supplied local service competitively. The up­
shot of the agreement was that the Bell System secured one hundred per­
cent of the long distance market and more than eighty percent of local 
customers for most of the rest of the century.
One legacy of the Kingsbury Agreement was a peculiar federalist 
structure of regulation. Regulation of the interstate portion of the tele­
phone system was granted to the Interstate Commerce Commission 
(which also regulated the railroads), while intrastate service (both local 
service and shorter long distance) was to be regulated by the states. Of 
course, the distinction was artificial, because the entire system was a sin­
gle network. Hence, federal and state officials were forced to find some 
way of dividing the company’s investments for purposes of defining 
jurisdictional authority. Initially, the problem was not severe, for the 




























































































But eventually, as the uses of the network became more complex and long 
distance became not only important but crucial to some new information 
services, the jurisdictional boundary had substantial political significance, 
a point to which we will return.
Within a decade, the structure created by Kingsbury was again contro­
versial. The main point of controversy in the era between the two world 
wars concerned AT&T’s vertical integration into equipment manufactur­
ing. Virtually every piece of equipment in the Bell System -  switches, 
transmission facilities, customer premises equipment, and even the wire 
inside a residence connecting the telephone to the network -  was 
manufactured by one division of AT&T, then owned and rented to 
customers by another. Because Bell’s local monopoly was not complete, 
other telephone companies were a potential market for equipment. And 
because the U.S. is such a large country, even fifteen to twenty percent of 
local service was enough to attract quite large, efficient companies (the 
non-Bell market was comparable in size to one of the largest European 
countries). Once these companies succeeded in selling to the independent 
local exchange carriers, they naturally wanted to sell to the Bell System as 
well. The unwillingness of AT&T to allow them to bid on Bell System 
procurement gave rise to the next era of controversy.
The debate over the industry structure culminated in the passage of the 
Communications Act of 1934. One version of the bill would have divested 
equipment manufacturing from AT&T, but eventually the bill that passed 
called upon the newly created Federal Communications Commission to 
study the allegations that AT&T was not an efficient manufacturer and 
that it unfairly denied competitors the possibility of selling to its affili­
ates. The FCC was to report back to congress in five years; however, by 
the time the report was prepared, the war had begun, and the government 
set aside telecommunications policy.
The 1947 Antitrust Action and Its Aftermath
Soon after the end of the war, the FCC’s 1939 report began to be dis­
cussed within the government. The FCC had concluded that vertical inte­
gration was unnecessary and probably pernicious. In response, the Tru­
man administration began the third antitrust investigation of AT&T, and 
ultimately filed a complaint demanding divestiture of manufacturing ac­
tivities. But before the case was litigated, Eisenhower succeeded Truman 
as president, and immediately put in motion negotiations to terminate the 
antitrust proceeding. The deal that emerged appeared favorable to 
AT&T, but the company would soon regret it. Basically, AT&T was al­
lowed to retain its vertically integrated telephone monopoly, but it was 
required to allow anyone to use its patents on semiconductors (which 
were invented at Bell Labs) without royalty, and not to enter any business 
other than telecommunications (including computers and semiconductors 




























































































The importance of the decree was that it kept the nation’s most techno­
logically adept electronics firm out of the two most promising new indus­
tries of the century. As a result, new firms rapidly invested in both pro­
duction and research in a wide variety of microelectronic and computer 
technologies that were technically very similar to the underlying technol­
ogy of telecommunications. These firms rapidly became as sophisticated 
as AT&T in these other activities. Moreover, like the independent tele­
phone suppliers of the pre-War era, they perceived numerous opportuni­
ties for selling new equipment to either Bell System telephone companies 
or their customers. These developments were quite unlike those in other 
advanced economies, where in most cases the telephone service monopoly 
did not manufacture its equipment, and telephone equipment manufactur­
ers were permitted to enter technologically related industries. Conse­
quently, in other countries the dominant computer and microelectronics 
companies were not separated from, and in conflict with, the dominant 
manufacturers of telecommunications equipment.
The position of U.S. regulatory policy in the period immediately after 
World War II was that the national telecommunications system should 
remain a monopoly. But large businesses saw no reason why they should 
not be able to supply their own internal communications needs. More­
over, as time-sharing computers with remote terminals became available 
in the early 1960s, companies also sought to combine internal systems for 
telephones with their computer systems. Because Bell could not manufac­
ture or sell computers, the computers that were connected to a company’s 
telephone system were pieces of terminal equipment not owned by the 
telephone company. Why not the telephones as well? Or, why not build 
one’s own long-distance telephone link to connect the computers and tele­
phones in a company’s various facilities, avoiding the telephone system 
entirely for all intracompany business throughout the nation?
Both large users of telecommunications services and the rapidly grow­
ing computer and microelectronics industries advocated relaxing the re­
strictions against purely private alternatives to the telephone system. 
Eventually this pressure led to three significant policy changes: Above 
890, Carterfone, and MCI. Above 890 refers to a decision in 1959 to al­
low companies to build private microwave communications links for their 
own use. Carterfone refers to a decision a decade later to allow use of a 
radio telephone that was not manufactured and owned by AT&T. MCI, 
decided a few months after Carterfone, allowed a company to sell private 
long-distance telephone links to multiple businesses over a single, inde­
pendent network. All three decisions brought forth still more entrants, 
leading to rapid growth in customer-owned equipment and lines, and to 
competing small, specialized carriers that sold forms of long distance 
connection other than standard, voice-grade, dial-up station-to-station toll 
calls. By the mid-1970s, AT&T had to permit its customers to own their 
own telephones, to construct their own private networks, and to buy dedi­




























































































Nonetheless, the liberalizations from the late 1950s to the early 1970s 
did not fundamentally challenge AT&T’s structure. The company still 
bought equipment only from itself, and the vast bulk of telephone service 
-  ordinary telephone calls, whether local or long distance -  still used the 
AT&T network. Moreover, regulatory policy stopped short of forcing 
AT&T to give up these two remaining monopolies. MCI formally pro­
posed to the FCC that it be permitted to offer ordinary long distance toll 
calls over its network, but the Commission refused, stating that it held 
firm to the policy of a single, monopoly backbone network for ordinary 
telephone service.
The Post-1975 Restructuring
Facing little prospects for further reform at the FCC, the competitors 
took their case to court. MCI appealed the FCC’s ruling on competitive 
long distance toll service, and contacted the Department of Justice to in­
form the Antitrust Division about AT&T practices that MCI thought were 
intended to thwart competition. Meanwhile, numerous equipment manu­
facturers also complained to Justice, contending that AT&T was inhibit­
ing competition in terminal devices and refusing still to buy equipment 
from anyone other than its own manufacturing divisions.
The FCC lost its long-distance decision to MCI in 1978. The court 
ruled that U.S. regulatory policy is based on the assumption that competi­
tion is preferred, and that regulation should attempt to approximate com­
petitive conditions only when competition is not viable. MCI’s willingness 
to compete with AT&T, therefore, should be welcomed, not opposed, 
unless the FCC could find evidence to support the conclusion that con­
sumers would be harmed by MCI’s entry. Note that the decision cleverly 
switched the burden of proof. Instead of MCI having to prove that its 
service would benefit consumers, AT&T and the FCC had to prove that 
MCI’s entry would harm them. The Commission did not attempt to offer 
such proof, but instead simply opened the door to long distance competi­
tion.
Meanwhile, the government filed its antitrust suit against AT&T, re­
questing that the company be divested, separating local service, long dis­
tance and manufacturing into three separate, unrelated businesses, and 
further dividing local service into several companies. The case was filed 
despite opposition from several other federal agencies, including the De­
partment of Defense, which for reasons of national security valued having 
a single, integrated long-distance carrier. In both the Nixon and the 
Carter administrations, other agencies attempted vigorously to convince 
the Antitrust Division to alter its objectives and the White House to inter­
vene to stop or at least to change the course of the litigation, but to no 
avail.
AT&T turned to congress to seek reversal of both the MCI decision 




























































































five-year lobbying campaign in support of a new communications act that 
would legally enshrine the concept of a single backbone monopoly tele­
phone network, provided by a vertically integrated entity. The proposed 
bill, if enacted, would have mooted the government’s case and vacated the 
licenses of AT&T’s long distance competitors. Twice the bill came per­
ilously close to passing, actually being adopted by one house of congress 
at one point. Then, in 1981, most analysts believed that the election of 
Ronald Reagan would lead to the same fate as befell the Truman adminis­
tration’s antitrust attack. The Reagan administration opposed the case; 
however, the entire administration, from the President down to the At­
torney General, was not permitted to participate in making policy in this 
area because of their previous associations with AT&T. Hence, a middle 
level official, the Assistant Attorney General for Antitrust, William Bax­
ter, had total control of the litigation.
Although a Reagan appointee, Baxter was also a strong advocate of 
competition and an opponent of regulation. He saw divestiture of AT&T 
as a way to encourage competition and deregulate the industry. Soon after 
taking office, he announced that he would litigate the case to conclusion.
Unlike the Nixon, Ford and Carter administrations, the Reagan White 
House opposed the antitrust case, but was powerless to stop it. Hence, 
Baxter’s superiors turned to congress, requesting legislation that would 
force the case to be dropped. After months of debate in a very even fight, 
the AT&T bill failed a final time. Within two months, AT&T gave up, 
offering a settlement that gave the Antitrust Division most of what it 
wanted. After a century, the forces for liberalization had finally won. 
The telephone system was going to be structurally dismembered, and 
nearly all of it opened to competition.
The lesson in the final events between 1975 and 1984, when divestiture 
finally took place, is profound. Not only did a liberalization policy never 
formally pass congress or enjoy open support from the president, it al­
most certainly never could have passed as a legislative program. In this 
case, two court decisions and a crusading bureaucrat whose superiors 
could not intervene turned the industry on its head. Of course, just as the 
policy never passed, so, too, the reversal of the policy also failed. In 
essence, whatever the FCC, the courts and the antitrust authorities man­
aged to concoct during this era could not be reversed politically. In the 
end, congress was unwilling to pick a winner in a battle in which both 
sides were represented by very strong, well organized interests. AT&T, 
other local exchange companies, and state regulatory officials opposed 
liberalization, while numerous companies in computers, microelectronics 
and telecommunications equipment and some large business customers 
favored it.
Of course, underpinning the story is the constraint of technical and 
economic reality. If the advocates of change had not had a reasonable ba­
sis in believing that they could participate effectively in the industry, gov­




























































































“new ideas” in the form of scientific advancement caused more companies 
to want to compete with AT&T in a wider variety of markets. Technol­
ogy had developed at an astounding rate, and new service ideas were 
emerging in numerous companies besides AT&T. Nonetheless, the notion 
that important segments of the industry could be competitive was cer­
tainly not new. To the extent new ideas played a role, it was a political 
one -  increasing the number of organized interests that sought to 
compete.
As in other instances of liberalization, the decision to permit competi­
tion, because competition was viable, expanded its own support con­
stituency after the fact. Firms, employees, stockholders and customers of 
the successful entrants lobbied for the preservation of liberalization, but 
they were fewer and less well organized before it took place. Conse­
quently, liberalization was difficult both to start and to stop. In this way, 
the ability of the FCC to take gradual liberalizing actions made possible 
the more radical changes that occurred later.
Policy after Divestiture
Because telecommunications liberalization was gradual, spanning more 
than two decades, one cannot make a clear before and after comparison 
between the eras of regulated monopoly and competition. Moreover, the 
facts are further clouded by the rapid rate of technological progress in 
the industry. Here I will focus on surely the most important and dramatic 
event, the divestiture of AT&T, and the regulatory policies that followed.
Divestiture was by far the most important reform for several reasons. 
First, in all segments of the telecommunications industry except customer 
premises equipment, AT&T had not lost its dominance during the earlier 
reform period. Before divestiture, it still manufactured 85 percent of 
telephone company equipment, still controlled over 90 percent of long 
distance service, and was positioned to control information services and 
new radio telephone technology. Second, divestiture fragmented the local 
exchange business. Instead of one large company with 85 percent of all 
local access lines, the nation had seven independent Bell System local ac­
cess companies, each of which was only slightly larger than the largest 
predivestiture independent, General Telephone. Thus, the equipment pro­
curement industry had been made substantially more competitive on the 
demand side than it was on the supply side, where AT&T was still 
dominant.
The Basis for Divestiture
The theory of divestiture was that entry would make the supply side com­
petitive. No telecommunications market was made structurally more 




























































































passible. Thus, it relied on the belief that AT&T, as a monopoly, was 
sufficiently inefficient and lethargic that it could not retain is dominance 
without the protection of vertical integration. Fragmenting local exchange 
carriers by creating seven Bell Operating Companies facilitated this ob­
jective by reducing the likelihood that a cozy bilateral monopoly between 
service and manufacturing would survive organizational separation.
The divestiture agreement set forth rules concerning which firms could 
compete in which markets. The agreement first created a new geopolitical 
entity, the Local Access and Transportation Area, or LATA. Within these 
areas, local exchange companies (the Bell System companies that provided 
basic access) could provide ordinary telephone service. Approximately 
160 LATAs were created, all considerably larger than a single local ex­
change, and some consisting of entire states. Thus, the Bell Operating 
Companies were given the right to provide long distance service inside 
LATAs, which accounts for approximately 25 percent of all long distance 
revenues.
Telephone calls crossing a LATA boundary were required to use a 
long distance carrier. All long distance carriers were to be provided with 
“equal access” to customers, meaning that the carrier designated by a 
customer would automatically be the one used when the customer dialed a 
long distance number. To comply with equal access, the BOCs were re­
quired to spend billions of dollars in new switching equipment, creating a 
huge market for digital switches in the U.S. The equal access provision, 
although adopted to facilitate long distance competition, also served to en­
courage competition in equipment manufacturing by creating a very large 
surge in demand immediately after the Bell Operating Companies were 
opened to competitive suppliers.
The local exchange carriers were prohibited to enter a variety of busi­
nesses, notably equipment manufacturing, interLATA long distance, and 
information services (recently, the information services prohibition has 
been relaxed). Thus, the idea of the decree was to focus BOCs on provid­
ing the backbone system of local access and to let others supply the 
equipment for building it, the equipment for customers, the services 
(other than ordinary telephone service) that would be provided, and the 
long distance network connecting local systems.
The rationale for the line-of-business restrictions was that without them 
local exchange carriers could use their monopoly in basic access to advan­
tage themselves unduly in other markets. Regulation could not protect 
against self-dealing. When technology is evolving rapidly, numerous 
small technical decisions must be made, and these can determine whose 
proprietary equipment and software works best in the network. Regula­
tors can never hope to second guess these decisions, and even if they try, 
the primary effect would be to slow and to distort technological progress.
Implicit in this view was a belief that the value of diversity and com­
petition exceeded the economies of network integration. In defending it­




























































































hibited important economies of integration: economies of scale in net­
work components, and economies of scope in the joint design of the entire 
network. In practice, these economies were quite limited, and largely 
confined to basic access. Switches had become modular with digital tech­
nology, and afforded no further economies after a few hundred ports. 
Transmission had scale economies, but hardware costs had shrunk to 
about ten percent of the costs of long distance carriers. Hence, organiza­
tional efficiency and marketing effectiveness had become the most impor­
tant determinants of the performance of a long distance carrier.
Other arguments were also advanced to support a single national 
monopoly. One was the pursuit of universal service: the provision of 
telephone service to every household. Under regulation, prices for 
telecommunications services had levied a heavy usage-based tax on long 
distance that was used to cover the costs of basic access. The result was a 
massive subsidy of access in small towns and rural areas. The cost of ba­
sic access is governed primarily by the distance of a customer from the 
local switch, and in areas with low population density these distances are 
much greater than in larger cities. Hence, by the time of divestiture, both 
business and residential access prices in small communities were far be­
low cost, paid for primarily by prices far in excess of costs for long dis­
tance telephone calls.
The universal service argument was a red herring. Separation of long 
distance from local service companies did not prevent the latter from 
charging the former for use of the system. Moreover, before divestiture, 
the FCC was moving in any case to reduce the subsidy by reducing usage 
charges on long distance. The cross-subsidy policy was creating enormous 
economic inefficiencies because the commodity being taxed, long dis­
tance, had a highly elastic (price-sensitive) demand, while the commodity 
being subsidized, access, had an almost perfectly inelastic (price-insensi­
tive) demand. Hence, price reductions for access had essentially no effect 
on the penetration of the telephone system, but significantly curtailed long 
distance usage. On balance, consumers would be better off paying more 
for access and less for long-distance. The best way to assure universal 
service was to use higher access fees in urban areas to offset the higher 
costs in small communities. In any case, how the subsidy was raised had 
nothing to do with the structure of the industry.
The Regulatory System
Until a few years after divestiture, the telephone system was regulated 
jointly by federal and state regulators using the traditional technique of 
rate-base regulation. The basic approach was to set a revenue requirement 
for the company that would cover all reasonable costs, plus a reasonable 
rate of profit. Because state and federal regulators shared responsibility, a 
key part of regulation was an arbitrary division of the costs of the system 




























































































access would be divided between the two on the basis of relative use. 
Hence, the fixed cost of a telephone access line was divided between the 
jurisdictions on the basis of quantity of output, and thereby implicitly was 
treated as a variable cost.
A second feature of the system was “residual pricing”. All services 
other than basic access had prices set approximately to maximize their 
revenues. Basic access was then priced at whatever level was necessary to 
cover the rest of the costs of the firm.
The regulatory system had two primary effects. Most obviously, it 
subsidized local service in small communities. Access prices were approx­
imately the same everywhere, but costs were far higher in rural areas. 
The less obvious part had to do with the effects of long distance competi­
tion on the subsidy, and it was here that long distance competition created 
havoc in regulatory policy.
AT&T had designed its switches so that only one long distance carrier 
could connect to them for ordinary dial-up long distance. A competitor 
entered by simply becoming local subscribers. Customers would dial the 
competitor’s local number, reach its nearest switch, and then dial a long 
distance number and a billing number. Because the AT&T component of 
the call was entirely local, AT&T collected none of the surcharge on long 
distance that was paying for rural local service. Moreover, because of 
residual pricing, every penny of shortfall in long distance surcharge went 
straight to an increase in basic monthly access fees. Hence, competitors 
could charge a much lower long distance price than AT&T, not only 
taking away AT&T’s customers but forcing AT&T to raise its other 
prices. Before divestiture, none of these effects were very substantial, for 
the long distance carriers had a very low market share, but the rapid 
growth of competition constituted a serious threat to the entire system of 
price regulation.
A common view was that only the perversities in the system encour­
aged entry, but this was clearly not the case. When the competitors were 
offered equal access (and an equal surtax on their calls), they chose it 
rather than the old system, for most customers did not want the trouble of 
dialing all the numbers that were required to use a competitive long dis­
tance carrier. In addition, for technical reasons, the old system substan­
tially degraded the quality of the competitor’s long distance service.
Not surprisingly, the effect of entry divided the regulators. State au­
thorities set the basic access price that the FCC’s pro-competitive policy 
was forcing upward. The FCC, meanwhile, reaped the political benefit of 
declining long distance prices arising from both technological progress 
and competition. State regulators, therefore, joined AT&T in opposing 
competition.
Divestiture caused the positions of the divested parts of AT&T to di­
vide as had their regulators. Suddenly the new AT&T, consisting of 




























































































ners, the operating companies. By dividing the company, divestiture gave 
momentum to reform of the pricing system.
The primary price reform sought by the FCC was to eliminate the 
subsidy of access by long distance and other usage-based charges in the 
federal jurisdiction. (Federal and state regulators still dispute the bound­
ary of jurisdictional authority, with both claiming responsibility for the 
interconnection prices for information service providers.) By the time of 
divestiture, usage-based long distance charges were paying for 26 percent 
of the costs of local access. The FCC’s proposal was gradually to replace 
these charges with a fixed monthly fee for basic access to long distance. 
State regulators and local exchange carriers, believing that customers 
would not heed the distinction between the federal and state monthly 
charge and so would blame them for what appeared to be an increase in 
monthly subscriber charges, opposed the plan, and appealed to congress.
As with the previous AT&T legislative proposal to forestall competi­
tion, state regulators and local exchange carriers came very close to vic­
tory. The House of Representatives overwhelmingly passed a bill elimi­
nating the monthly federal access charge to residential customers, and the 
bill went on to the Senate. Just before the Senate was to act, the FCC be­
gan trimming its sails, eventually proposing to cut the residential access 
charge in half, and to phase it in over a longer period. After taking these 
actions, the Senate defeated the House bill by a margin of one vote.
These events can be more easily understood with the aid of a diagram 
depicting the positions of the parties, as shown in Figure 2.1. The line 
represents the amount of an access charge,
Figure 2.1: The Politics of Access Charges
Q H S 2/3 P
with the right-hand side corresponding to higher prices. The status quo 
(Q) is a zero basic access fee for the federal share of local exchange costs. 
The position of the FCC and the president (P) was for shifting all of the 
federal share for fixed local access costs to a monthly charge. The House 
position (H), reflecting the position of its Democratic majority, favored 
monthly access charges only for business. The Senate position (S), reflect­
ing that body’s Republican majority, was more sympathetic to monthly 
access charges proposed by an administration of the same party, but it 
feared political reprisals from constituents when a highly visible fixed 
monthly charge was substituted for a less visible long-distance usage fee. 
Hence, the Senate preferred H to P, although it was not very close to ei­
ther position.
Once the House passed a bill representing its most desired policy out­




























































































FCC proposal to take effect. But the FCC favored the Senate’s most pre­
ferred outcome, S, to H, and sought to forestall legislation by adopting S. 
(In fact, the FCC could do even better by adopting the point 2/3, the pre­
ferred policy of the member whose vote is needed to sustain a presidential 
veto of a bill enacting any access charge policy between 2/3 and Q; how­
ever, this action would require that the president bear all of the political 
costs of a monthly access charge and also conflict openly with the Repub­
lican leadership in the Senate, so that an agreement to settle for S is easy 
to understand.)
Although settling for less than its preferred position, the FCC 
nonetheless profoundly changed the structure of telephone price regula­
tion. Eventually, all of the fixed costs of local access probably will be 
collected through a fixed monthly charge, but even in the short run most 
of these costs would not continue to be covered by a surcharge on long 
distance.
Post-Reform Performance
Liberalization of telecommunications policy had very little effect on the 
overall performance of the industry until the late 1970s. Until customer 
equipment was liberalized and long-distance competitors were permitted 
to offer ordinary toll service, competition was too limited and too small a 
fraction of the industry for its effects to be detected in overall industry 
data. Systematic data on telephone prices have been collected since 1935, 
and they reveal that from 1935 until 1980, the price index for all services 
rose about two percentage points per year less rapidly than the overall 
consumer price index. Basic monthly service for residential users also 
rose less rapidly than inflation.
After 1978, when liberalization began to have an important effect, 
nominal telephone prices rose far more rapidly than ever before. The in­
dex of all telephone prices rose by 4.3 percent annually between 1978 and 
1988, and the average basic residential access price (including the new 
FCC access charge after 1986) more than doubled, from $8.32 on Jan­
uary 1, 1980, to $16.66 on October 1, 1987. These data were the source 
of the controversy in the mid-1980s about the wisdom of liberalization, 
structural reform, and the shift from usage charges to monthly access 
fees; however, these figures do not indicate declining performance in the 
industry. About one-third of the price increase reflected higher real in­
terest rates in the U.S. since the late 1970s, which significantly affected 
telephone prices because the industry is so capital intensive. Moreover, 
the industry’s price performance retained roughly its relationship to 
overall inflation as the telephone price index rose 1.8 percentage points 
less rapidly than consumer prices generally. Thus, the very large rate of 
increase in residential access -  about ten percent per year from 1980 to 




























































































especially interstate long distance (the service regulated by the FCC that 
benefitted from the federal monthly access charge), where nominal prices 
declined by an average of seven percent per year from 1983 (the last year 
before divestiture) until 1988. Intrastate long distance prices, regulated 
by the states and by regulators who opposed divestiture and liberalization, 
also fell, but not as dramatically, with nominal prices declining about one 
percent per year.
The figures on service prices understate the beneficial effects of lib­
eralization for four reasons.
First, the aggregate price data were affected by the massive investment 
program that local carriers undertook in the mid-1980s. Carriers planned 
to replace analog switching with digital switching, but the equal access 
provision of the divestiture agreement accelerated this replacement. Thus, 
the capabilities and capacity of the telephone system increased substan­
tially in the 1980s, with no dramatic effect on overall price trends.
Second, the data do not take into account the effects of divestiture and 
competition in customer equipment. From ordinary telephones to com­
plex equipment for business computer communications, prices have fallen 
substantially while quality and variety have expanded. In most lines of 
customer equipment, AT&T is no longer anything more than one of 
many players.
Third, since the mid-1980s many new service providers have entered 
the industry. Literally millions of customers now use computer bulletin 
boards, electronic mail, electronic credit verification, airline computer 
reservation systems, and electronic shopping services. In principle, all of 
these services could have been provided by an integrated AT&T; how­
ever, prior to liberalization of the industry, these services were not de­
veloped extensively, and have not been as extensively developed in other 
advanced industrialized societies where liberalization has not taken place.
Fourth, separation of radio communications systems from traditional 
telephony has been followed by a vast expansion of services using over- 
the-air transmission. The most impressive development is the explosive 
growth of mobile communications involving cellular radio and other new 
forms of mobile services that are permitted to interconnect with the tele­
phone system.
The complete picture is that since the late 1970s, the U.S. has experi­
enced an explosive growth in communications services. Whereas people 
still disagree about the extent to which liberalizing reforms are responsi­
ble for these events, there can be no disagreement that segmenting the in­
tegrated national system did not seriously erode performance in either the 





























































































The Causes of Change
The dramatic restructuring of the telecommunications sector in the U.S. 
constitutes something of a puzzle to explain. Certainly a major cause is 
advancements in technology, which reduced the importance of the hard­
ware costs of the backbone network in the overall economics of the indus­
try, and vastly increased the scope of uses to which the telecommunica­
tions system could be put. But technology advanced everywhere, not just 
the United States, so it cannot be the sole cause of liberalization and, 
especially, restructuring.
The role of interest groups also played an important role. U.S. 
telecommunications policy clearly was affected by the presence of com­
panies such as IBM, Hewlett-Packard, ITT, and Motorola, to name a few, 
who were highly successful in various aspects of the electronics sector 
and perceived themselves as having something important to gain by lib­
eralization in telecommunications. Here the U.S. situation differs from 
circumstances in some other advanced economies, especially with respect 
to the extent of competition in these industries. But support from poten­
tial competitors does not appear to be either necessary or sufficient for 
reform. In Great Britain, British Telecom and Plessy dominated the do­
mestic industry, with little organized support for liberalization. In 
France, the major communications equipment supplier (Alcatel) was sep­
arate from the nationalized service supplier and the major computer firm 
(Bull). Moreover, when the reform era began, both manufacturers had 
substantial foreign ownership (ITT and Honeywell), presumably giving 
them less political clout. Yet France has hardly been a leader in liberal­
ization. To the contrary, it has nationalized equipment and pursued a 
policy of greater centralization.
One factor that was quite different in the U.S. was a fundamental 
change in political representation just as the reform era began. In the 
mid-1960s, the U.S. Supreme Court substantially changed the method of 
electing both state legislators and members of the House of Representa­
tives, ruling that the Constitution required that all legislative districts ex­
cept in the Senate had to have precisely the same population in the first 
election after a decennial census. In many states, legislative districts had 
been largely unchanged for decades, so that rapidly growing urban areas 
did not receive proportionately more seats as their fraction of the total 
population increased. As a result, some urban districts were as much as 
three times larger than some rural districts, and over half of the House 
was elected from districts in which over half of the population lived in 
small towns or rural areas -  even though only about 25 percent of the 
population lived in such communities.
By the early 1970s, legislative districts had been redrawn to equalize 
representation. The effect was to reduce the representation of rural inter­
ests. Regulatory policy in all areas, but especially utility services, had 




























































































was offered service at an affordable price. Because rural service is far 
more costly to provide in areas with low population density, regulators 
developed the policy of cross-subsidization. In telecommunications, long 
distance service was accorded a secondary priority to basic access, and so 
was taxed to cover the difference between price and cost in high-cost ar­
eas.
With redrawing of legislative districts, the political support for rural 
subsidies can be expected to decline with the decline in rural representa­
tion. Hence, the opposition to liberalization in the legislatures of the mid- 
1970s ought to have been substantially less than it would have been a 
decade earlier. Because three times key features of the liberalization pro­
gram were nearly stopped by legislation (the 1976 AT&T initiative, the 
1981 Reagan attempt, and the 1986 access charge controversy), it is cer­
tainly plausible that without the Supreme Court’s reform of representa­
tion, the U.S. today would not have a telecommunications policy that was 
greatly different from policy elsewhere.
One aspect of post-reform pricing bears out this theory. Between 1983 
(the last year before divestiture) and 1986, the relationship between mral 
and urban business access prices changed dramatically. The average state- 
regulated business basic access price rose approximately $6.00 per month 
in local exchanges serving fewer than 5,000 terminals. (A terminal is any 
piece of customer equipment that is connected to the network, and the 
population served by a local exchange is about twice the number of ter­
minals. In large urban areas, central office switches normally serve tens 
of thousands of terminals, so that a locality with 5,000 or fewer terminals 
is almost always a small, isolated town or a rural community.) By con­
trast, in local areas with 1,000,000 or more terminals, corresponding to 
the 25 or so largest metropolitan areas and containing about half of the 
total population of the U.S., basic business access prices fell by $0.22 
during the same period. In addition, after 1986 businesses paid the new 
$6.00 per month federal access charge that financed the reduction in in­
terstate toll charges.
For residences, the change was not as dramatic: the increase in smaller 
communities was about $2.25, compared to an increase of $1.87 in the 
largest cities. When the $3.00 monthly federal access charge is included, 
the fair conclusion is that no perceptible change took place in the struc­
ture of residential access prices. But the increase in residential access 
charges caused the price of service (including the federal charge) to be 
approximately equal to its average cost in most cities. Rural residents paid 
about $2.00 a month less for service, but were still heavily subsidized. 
The source of the subsidy switched, however. Business customers every­
where now pay over $30.00 per month, a price that substantially exceeds 
all estimates of the average cost of local service in all cities exceeding 
about 25,000 in population. Moreover, although rural businesses still pay 
less, the difference between business service prices in large cities and 




























































































magnitude of the rural subsidy fell as a consequence of liberalization, an 
effect that is broadly consistent with the results expected from changes in 
the system of political representation.
Rural subsidization has not ended, of course, but there is no reason to 
expect such a dramatic result. Rural industries such as agriculture, 
forestry and mining constitute a large part of the economy. Agriculture, 
although it accounts for only about three percent of GDP in the U.S., is 
still among the largest industries. These industries are well-organized and 
so can be expected to be politically effective. Moreover, voters do not ap­
pear to be so strongly self-interested that they want to end rural subsidies, 
for the idea of nationwide rate-averaging for basic utility services appears 
to have broader support than just from rural constituencies. But the theo­
retical prediction is a modest one -  the decline in rural representation 
should lead to a decline in rural subsidies -  and this prediction is con­
firmed by the data in telephone pricing.
Conclusions
As recently as 1986, with the congressional reaction to access prices, the 
liberalization policies in the U.S. always seemed perilously close to rever­
sal. The path of change had been slow, primarily because rapid change 
simply would not be tolerated by the political system. But at each crisis 
point, the restructuring and competition policies managed to survive. By 
the late 1980s, the performance of the industry was so high, and improv­
ing so rapidly, that a popular movement to roll back the clock was un­
likely from either congress or the public at large.
Nevertheless, the U.S. experiment is not over, and still could be signif­
icantly reversed (although never to even the structure of 1980). The re­
form era was made possible in part by key “noncomplying” actions by 
bureaucrats or judges who advanced policy reform without the support of 
legislation or the president. The reversal of the FCC’s decision prohibit­
ing competitive entry into toll service and the success of the Assistant 
Attorney General for Antitrust in fending off his own president’s attempt 
to kill divestiture are key events in the history of the new structure and 
policy.
The lesson is that similar surprises from judges or regulators could oc­
cur again. Noncomplying acts by bureaucrats and judges create a new sta­
tus quo, and sometimes a new organized interest to defend the new policy. 
In the more complicated process of policy change in the legislature, non­
complying acts benefit from the status quo bias.
The most important change that could be imposed without direct politi­
cal ratification would be to allow local exchange carriers to enter manu­
facturing, information services, and long distance. These actions would 
run the risk of causing a loss of competition in at least some important 




























































































tration FCC -  favor eliminating at least some of the restrictions on busi­
ness activities of local exchange carriers, although not because they 
openly favor eliminating competition. Instead, the position of the Bush 
FCC is standard neoconservative noninterventionist economic policy: let 
companies do what they want, in the expectation that they will then have 
an incentive to innovate and to provide better service.
Eventually, local exchange carriers will be permitted to reintegrate. 
The issue is when. Advocates of structural separation of regulated 
monopoly from competition favor permitting reintegration only in ac­
tivities in which competition is secure from self-serving, discriminatory 
practices by a monopolist due to the state of technology and the market. 
Regulators are viewed as part of the problem, not the solution; better 
regulatory policy is not viewed as an effective countermeasure to mo­
nopolization of competitive markets by a reintegrated local exchange 
carrier. For most residential customers, this point of view implies re­
laxation of line-of-business restrictions only when residential users enjoy 
an alternative to the local wireline carrier for basic access. Cable televi­
sion, cellular radio, or one of several other emerging technologies might 
provide alternative access, but probably not until the end of the Twentieth 
Century at best.
If the past is a guide, policy will steer a course between the extreme 
positions, following a path of gradualism. Local exchange carriers will be 
given more and more exceptions to the restrictions handed down by di­
vestiture, but not sweeping ones that would threaten competition in any 
component of the industry. Hence, the advocates of line-of-business re­
strictions will win more than they lose, and reintegration probably will 
not take place until other technologies have a chance at competing effec­
tively with local telephone companies for basic access service. The nega­
tive side of this policy is that gradualism fans the expectations of local ex­
change carriers about their eventual entry into other parts of the industry. 
These expectations suppress their willingness to create the technological 
capacity in the local network for a variety of new services and new cus­
tomer equipment. For example, some Bell Operating Companies have re­
fused to offer new forms of ISDN interconnection, which their political 
opponents attribute to their unwillingness to give others a first-in advan­
tage while the local carriers are prohibited from offering these services. 
Of course, if new services and equipment cannot be offered, the competi­
tive conditions perceived as necessary for relaxing restrictions on the 
BOCs can never be met. Meanwhile, another judge could simply vacate 
the restrictions, and the structural experiment would be over prema­
turely.
The lessons from the U.S. reforms cannot yet be conclusively drawn, 
and indeed may never be clear. Because technology is evolving so rapidly 
in the information sector, which countries and nations are luckiest in the 
innovation race will play a major role in deciding which country’s infor­




























































































largely extraneous reasons (e.g. its strong university research capabilities 
in engineering and physical science). Or, the fragility of the institutional 
support for the U.S. experiment could cause its abrupt end before its con­
sequences can be fully apparent.
Nevertheless, throughout the reform period, the progress of liberaliza­
tion has been associated with a certain sense of technological inexorabil­
ity. Individual policy decisions may have hastened or slowed the pace, but 
the size, fragmentation, diversity and state of technical advancement of 
the U.S. information sector (including microelectronics) is probably the 
single most important force affecting policy in the long run. The contro­
versies regarding structure are rightfully debated with vigor, for they can 
not only determine the winners and losers in the current round of techno­
logical advance, they can also substantially affect how quickly the next 
advance will come. But in the long run, it is quite likely that the genie has 
been permanently set loose from the bottle: an essentially competitive, 
minimally regulated industry is almost certain to be the future of the U.S. 
industry. And, if performance since the mid-1970s is a valid basis for 
prediction, the U.S. will certainly be no worse off from the experiment, 
and conceivably will be far better off -  sufficiently so that other advanced 





























































































Lecture #3 -  Airlines
Economic deregulation has been close to complete in the entire U.S. 
transportation sector, and airlines are no exception. Indeed, the agency 
that was created to regulate the airlines in 1938, the Civil Aeronautics 
Board, was abolished in 1985, with a few remaining regulatory functions 
transferred to the Department of Transportation. Thus, nowhere can the 
promise and problems of deregulation be more thoroughly assessed than 
in transportation.
The airline industry is an especially fruitful example to study because 
of some interesting, unique characteristics that have raised several impor­
tant policy issues during the deregulation era. For the most part, deregu­
lation has been simpler to understand in the other transportation indus­
tries (trucking, railroads, buses, domestic water carriers). Briefly, de­
regulation has been an unqualified success in freight shipping. It has re­
duced transportation costs immensely, saved the railroad system from fi­
nancial collapse, improved service quality, and increased efficiency in all 
parts of the sector. The losers from deregulation have been some ineffi­
cient transportation companies that simply could not compete effectively, 
and some categories of organized labor. Part of the cost of regulation was 
especially high wages and inefficient work rules that could not be sus­
tained in a competitive industry, even a unionized one. Although em­
ployment has increased in the transportation sector, the initial effect of 
deregulation was loss of jobs and wage reductions in many companies.
Airline deregulation has had a similar performance, but the history of 
the deregulation era is more complex (and the results more controversial) 
for three fundamental reasons.
First, airlines are very sensitive to the business cycle and to fuel prices. 
Hence short-term economic fluctuations and disruptions in the world oil 
market cause booms and busts in the industry. Inevitably, advocates of 
deregulation are prone to claim undue credit for the booms (the mid- 
1980s, when economic growth was rapid and oil prices were falling), 
while opponents cannot resist the temptation to attribute the busts to de­
regulation (the 1979-82 and 1990 combined economic downturns and 
runups in oil prices).
Second, more than other transportation modes, the airline industry 
produces a highly differentiated product. The basic reason is that airlines 
primarily carry people, not goods, and people care a great deal more 
about the speed, comfort and convenience of travel than do cartons of 



























































































ciency of a route (how many stops?) or the frequency of service (when do 
I have to leave to make my 11 a.m. appointment?) can have a substantial 
effect on the implicit time cost of a trip. Because time is more valuable to 
people than to goods, the details of the elapsed time of a trip are more 
important, and are a significant source of product differentiation among 
flights and airlines. In addition, the amenities of the trip -  meals, in-flight 
service, seating comfort -  provide another potentially important source 
of product differentiation.
Third, aircraft investments are more lumpy, and the details of inter­
connection more important, than in other transportation industries. For 
example, a railroad has a great deal of flexibility in the length of a train, 
and can disassemble the cars of one train to reassemble them at an inter­
mediate destination to form new trains to continue different journeys. 
Moreover, because of the differences between freight and passengers with 
respect to the value of time, the freight modes have more flexibility in 
scheduling connections at intermediate points. And, for trucks and rails, a 
single load (a car or truck trailer) is normally a far smaller fraction of 
total traffic between two points than a single flight. Consequently, coor­
dination among flights is economically very important for airlines, giving 
rise to, first, an advantage for large, nationwide carriers, and second, a 
need for “interline” ticketing coordination. The former leads to oligo­
poly, and the latter can facilitate collusion, so that policy is more likely to 
face the potential problem of market power in airlines than in other 
transportation modes.
These three fundamental characteristics of the airline industry have 
made the deregulation era intellectually more interesting in the airline 
business than elsewhere. Indeed, in airlines deregulation probably en­
couraged rather than discouraged research on the economics of the indus­
try, which is the opposite of the effect with respect to the other trans­
portation modes. This research has vastly improved our understanding of 
the industry, providing explanations for post deregulation developments 
that had not been predicted by either research scholars, industry partici­
pants, or government officials. Likewise, the political events surrounding 
airline deregulation and subsequent calls for at least partial reregulation 
shed considerable light on the politics of reform.
The generalizability for other nations of the lessons in airline deregu­
lation, and deregulation of the other transportation modes, is less obvious 
than in utility industries, such as telecommunications and electricity. The 
reason lies in the economic geography of the United States. The U.S. is an 
extremely large country with a very low population density, and it is 
substantially more integrated economically than multinational trading 
groups like the European Economic Community. Consequently, both the 
supply and the demand characteristics of transportation industries differ 
between the U.S. and most of the rest of the world. Moreover, a substan­
tial part of the investment in transportation is fixed costs in terminals and 




























































































most other nations. For example, American railroads are far less impor­
tant for passenger service, and far more important in freight service, than 
are European railroads. Truck transportation in the U.S. is heavily 
advantaged by the far better and more extensive U.S. highway system and 
by lower fuel prices and road tolls. All of these factors would make the 
effects of liberalization differ between the U.S. and elsewhere.
Nevertheless, transportation regulation can be expected to have quali­
tatively similar effects everywhere: economically irrational route struc­
tures and price systems, and a general tendency to protect inefficient 
firms, to encourage excessive wages and inefficient work rules, and to use 
criteria other than cost and performance in making major capital invest­
ments. The key issue is not whether Europe or some other part of the 
world is like the U.S., but whether transportation can be sufficiently 
competitive that the inefficiencies of a less then perfect market structure 
are small compared to the inefficiencies arising from a protective regula­
tory umbrella.
Historical Origins
The airline industry had simple and highly competitive origins. Because 
early commercial aircraft were small and could fly only relatively short 
distances, the industry began with a very large number of very small 
companies, each serving a small geographic region. As technology pro­
gressed, the more successful firms expanded, some serving much of the 
nation, but the competitive structure of the industry remained.
The Role of the Postal System
The postal system played a major role in the development of the industry. 
A substantial part of the revenues of the industry during its first two 
decades consisted of fees for carrying air mail. Consequently, as part of 
postal policy, the federal government grew to have a major interest in 
how the industry operated. These interests focused on three main issues: 
costs, universal service, and reliability.
The postal service paid more for air mail service than the revenues it 
collected from its air mail customers. These losses arose from a problem 
within the postal system, which has always operated at a loss and subsi­
dized many services. In this case, the price structure also preserved the 
postal monopoly from direct competition by airlines. Regardless of the 
reasons, the payment to the airlines for air mail service was commonly 
termed a subsidy, and the postal service (as well as its political overseers) 
constantly discussed ways to cut these expenditures. One possibility was to 
make airlines less competitive so that they could charge more for passen­





























































































Universal service, an issue in all regulated sectors, meant the provision 
of air mail delivery to the maximum number of cities. Because aircraft 
carried mail, people and freight together, universal mail service meant 
universal airline service for other purposes. In some cases, passenger and 
freight demand was insufficient to justify a frequency of service that 
provided universal daily air mail. Hence, universal service meant a sub­
sidy for service to small towns. Price regulation allowed this subsidy to 
be buried in the price structure rather than form part of the government’s 
budget. Of course, long after postal revenues become relatively unimpor­
tant to airlines, the universal service objective had become an article of 
faith regarding policy toward the industry.
Reliability refers to the persistence of service. Daily mail deliveries are 
regarded as a necessary part of postal service, undaunted by any calamity. 
Aircraft flown by private firms were a potential threat to reliability. A 
company simply had to fly regularly, and disruptions due to bankruptcy 
or equipment failure were not acceptable. Consequently, the postal system 
wanted to deal with large, financially secure companies, not the “fly-by- 
night” small companies, often owned and flown by former stunt pilots, 
that characterized the early industry.
The Creation of A irline Regulation
The instigating event for airline regulation was the Great Depression. As 
in other industries, the Great Depression -  by definition -  was associated 
with large price reductions below long-run average cost, and financial 
failures within the airline business. The industry sought help in the form 
of price regulation. Its position was strengthened by several much-publi­
cized deaths in aircraft accidents during the 1930s, including the death of 
a senator. Officials from the larger companies blamed the deaths on the 
financial pressures facing small carriers, who, they alleged, responded to 
price wars by cutting maintenance, flying long hours, and otherwise 
shortcutting safety. The last argument was especially successful, for the 
view that economic competition leads to a reduction in safety persists de­
spite a mountain of evidence to the contrary -  perhaps a good example of 
rational ignorance concerning an important policy issue!
The argument that the airlines were “ruinously competitive” -  inca­
pable of surviving as providers of safe, reliable service in a competitive 
regime -  carried the day, and in 1938 the industry was subjected to regu­
lation of prices and route structure. The 1938 Civil Aviation Act created 
the CAB, which instituted a regulatory policy having four main features.
First, the industry was regulated according to rate of return regulation 
on an industry-wide scale. The CAB set a target rate of return, calculated 
industry-wide costs, and allowed prices to be set so as to return, on aver­
age, the target profit rate. In practice, this aspect of regulation did not 




























































































in earning the allowed rate of profit. The importance of the calculation 
was that it set prices based on industry average costs.
Second, the price structure was determined by a uniform pricing for­
mula that decoupled price and cost on a particular route. In essence, the 
price on a flight (P) was linearly dependent on the distance of the flight 
(D):
P = K + cD,
where K and c are constants. Moreover, K was set too low, and c too 
high, in relation to costs, so that, in general, short-haul flights with rela­
tively few passengers per day recovered less than the average cost of a 
passenger, whereas long-haul flights earned excess profits. The purpose, 
of course, was cross-subsidization of short flights from small towns to 
nearby large airports. A by-product of this pricing policy was that short- 
haul service was made artificially attractive, thereby assisting in the 
demise of the nation’s bus and rail passenger service.
The third element of CAB regulation was entry control through route 
authority. The CAB focused its control of the structure of the industry on 
licenses to fly between two points, not on whether a firm could enter the 
industry generally. To sustain cross-subsidies, the CAB needed to prevent 
competitive entry on the routes with excess profits, and to find a means to 
encourage carriers to fly on the losing routes. It did this by pairing route 
awards: companies were rewarded for serving uneconomic routes by 
gaining protection from entry or the authority to enter highly profitable, 
long distance routes. In addition, to facilitate cross-subsidization within a 
single company, the CAB promoted mergers. For thirty years, it allowed 
no new carriers to enter, and it actively encouraged consolidation of the 
existing carriers.
The fourth important feature of CAB policy was that it did not attempt 
to control directly the quality of service, other than by being more gen­
erous in awarding new routes to carriers that promised better service. 
The only service constraint was through the process of route awards. In 
order to be granted a route that was already served by another carrier, an 
airline had to prove that the carriers already in the market were provid­
ing inadequate service. Usually, this meant insufficiently frequent flights. 
As long as a carrier served a route above some minimum requirement to 
keep out competition, service quality was not subject to regulatory 
scrutiny.
Superficially, the CAB system was well designed to serve the con­
stituencies giving rise to regulation -  the industry, small towns, and the 
postal service. The skewed price structure and system of route awards 
served the universal service objective. The overly generous target profit 






























































































The airline industry that emerged under regulation contained basically 
three types of firms. First, a few very large firms served many large ci­
ties, plus numerous smaller ones. Second, a few more carriers were geo­
graphically concentrated in one region. Generally, the national carriers 
flew the east-west long distance routes, and the regionals flew the north- 
south long distance routes. In both cases, profits from long hauls were 
intended to subsidize uneconomic short routes. Third, a group of very 
small commuter carriers emerged due to a loophole in the regulatory 
policy. Aircraft below a certain weight limit were exempted from regu­
lation. This policy enabled very small towns to obtain service to nearby 
major cities on small aircraft that passengers would normally not choose 
if given an alternative, due to the level of comfort, noise and safety of the 
aircraft. The advantage of the loophole was that it enabled some routes to 
be served before it was feasible to do so with large aircraft flown by a 
major carrier.
For the first two categories of airlines, the regulatory policy of the 
CAB set up a quite perverse incentive structure that produced substantial 
inefficiency in the industry. The first source of inefficiency was the route 
system that emerged from CAB entry controls. Because a political pro­
cess, not costs and demand, determined route awards, the route structures 
of the airlines made no sense economically. Hence, airline service was 
more costly than it would have been in a regime in which airlines had 
been able to select their own routes. A New York Times advertisement 
unkowningly made the point well as it flashed the banner headline, “Why 
is Ozark in New York?” Ozark, a regional carrier in the midwest, had 
been given routes to major eastern cities. The idea was that it could use 
excess long-haul profits to offset losses from serving numerous small 
towns in Arkansas, Illinois and Missouri. Of course, Ozark was too small 
a presence in the eastern U.S. to provide efficient service. The answer to 
Ozark’s question in the advertisement was that it served New York only 
because the CAB wanted it there, not because their eastern routes made 
economic sense.
The second source of inefficiency arose from the incentive effects of 
the pricing system. The price structure provided an incentive to degrade 
service quality on the short-haul routes but to provide excessive service 
quality on long-haul routes. For the most part, the short-haul routes lost 
money and were monopolies, so firms sought to provide the minimum 
service that would still keep them in good standing at the CAB. The 
longer routes were generally profitable and served by more than one 
carrier. Not permitted to compete in pricing, carriers could only compete 
in service: a large number of convenient flights, better in-flight service, a 
more comfortable seating arrangement. Moreover, airlines could compete 




























































































ment. Thus, regulation induced airlines to adopt jet aircraft more rapidly 
than was warranted by cost and demand considerations.
The effect of these incentives was to erode the cross-subsidy of the 
price structure. The excess profits on long-distance routes served by 
multiple carriers were persistently eroded by service competition, raising 
average costs and leading to another round of overall price increases. 
Passengers in long-distance routes may have flown largely empty aircraft 
with gourmet food and oversized seats, but they also saw air fares steadily 
climb as the CAB attempted to regenerate subsidies.
Regulation’s Final Response
In the last few years of active CAB regulation, the agency made several 
attempts to use more detailed regulation to control the inefficiencies 
arising in the system. The most important were to change the system for 
establishing overall revenue requirements, and to attempt to control some 
aspects of service. On the revenue side, the CAB established revenue re­
quirements based on an assumption about capacity utilization. The target 
revenue requirement was calculated by assuming that carriers would 
achieve, a target rate of capacity utilization that was higher than the in­
dustry was then experiencing. Presumably, this would curtail service 
competition. On the service side, the CAB made several futile attempts to 
curtail competition. One was formally to adopt rules regarding in-flight 
services. For example, the agency adopted a rule carefully defining a 
sandwich in response to the outbreak of a “sandwich war” in which com­
petitors served ever more elaborate sandwiches to entice customers. An­
other CAB action encouraged agreements among carriers on flight fre­
quencies, paralleling the controls used in international markets.
All of these attempts failed, largely because airlines could figure out 
ways to compete at a more rapid pace than the CAB could write regula­
tions. Moreover, defining “optimal” capacity utilization rates, let alone 
sandwich composition, was a regulatory morass, placing the CAB in the 
unenviable position of becoming the chief operating officer of every air­
line.
Meanwhile, some quite disturbing facts were becoming known. Several 
large states deregulated their intrastate airlines, which were beyond the 
jurisdiction of the CAB if they did not fly interstate routes. Prices were 
substantially lower in these markets than in comparable interstate mar­
kets. Even unregulated short-haul routes often had lower prices than the 
supposedly subsidized interstate short-haul routes. In addition, an airline 
that existed only on paper -  World Airways -  applied for authority to fly 
3000 mile coast-to-coast routes for $100 per ticket when the going regu­
lated price was over $400, and took out newspaper advertisements to an­





























































































The Sources of Reform
Advocates of the “ideas” account of regulatory policy change point to two 
important prereform events. The first is the emergence of an economics 
research literature that was highly critical of airline regulation. Through­
out the 1960s and into the 1970s, a stream of studies found that airline 
regulation protected carriers from competition, reduced efficiency, and 
pushed up ticket prices. The second is grousing inside the staff of the 
CAB. Economic regulation requires a staff of economists, and by the late 
1960s the CAB economists had largely brought the profession’s view of 
airline regulation inside the agency. The economics staff continually 
bombarded the Board with analyses of the perversities of their policies, 
and leaked damaging information to their colleagues outside the agency.
The shortcoming of the “ideas” account is simply that the timing is 
wrong. Airline deregulation began in 1977. Before then, “reforms” had 
largely been for the purpose of trying to preserve the essence of the old 
system, or to make changes that were in the interests of the carriers, such 
as allowing some fare discounting so that carriers could engage in more 
effective price discrimination. Yet the economics profession in and out of 
the agency agreed before the last round of regulatory policies was 
adopted that the desirable change was greater competition. In essence, the 
agency was doing its best to preserve as much of the old structure as it 
could after the “idea” of substantial deregulation was fully accepted by 
economists. At best, the economics research contributed to the momentum 
for reform that developed later.
The “political entrepreneur” account does a better job of explaining the 
origins of reform. In this case, the political entrepreneur was Senator 
Edward Kennedy of Massachusetts. Recall that a political entrepreneur 
does two things: finds a way to organize a new political interest in favor 
of a policy change, then orchestrates a way to overcome the status quo 
bias in the political system so as to take advantage of the fact that all 
policies are inherently unstable. By doing both, the entrepreneur captures 
the political support of the new interest.
In 1973, Kennedy became interested in running for president. One 
problem he faced was an image of being too liberal, causing him to re­
ceive little support from parts of the business community that might be 
willing to support a Democratic presidential candidate. To overcome this 
image, Kennedy decided to respond to complaints from some businesses 
that regulation was too burdensome and ought to be reduced. In searching 
for an industry in which to advocate regulatory reform, he settled on air­
lines, in part because advisers from Harvard University informed him of 
the recent sorry performance of the industry and the CAB. Consequently, 
Kennedy decided to launch an attack on airline regulation.
A major problem Kennedy faced was that he was not a member of the 
Senate committee responsible for airline regulation. Hence, if he intro­




























































































them for the purpose of legislating, jurisdiction would be assigned to a 
committee that supported the existing structure and had gatekeeper rights 
to any reform proposal. Kennedy was, however, chairman of the commit­
tee in congress that was responsible for the general area of administrative 
law -  the procedures governing agencies in making decisions and courts 
in reviewing these decisions. Thus, he announced his intention to hold 
hearings on the administrative law of regulatory policy, with the purpose 
of reforming some aspects of administrative processes. He further an­
nounced that the first agency to be examined would be the CAB, and that 
the first witnesses would be from the agency, who would inform his 
committee about administrative problems that they were encountering. Of 
course, the remainder of the hearings was in fact a detailed review of the 
CAB’s policies. And, because Kennedy was a nationally visible politician 
running for president, the hearings received widespread media attention.
Kennedy’s principal rival for the Democratic presidential nomination, 
and the eventual winner, was Jimmy Carter. Carter sought to capture the 
same business constituency Kennedy was attempting to reach by advocat­
ing airline deregulation. In fact, a main theme of the Carter campaign 
was the necessity of having an “outsider” as president to reform a bloated 
Washington bureaucracy. Carter immediately signed on to Kennedy’s ad­
vocacy of airline deregulation, partly to deny the issue to his foe, but 
partly because the CAB was a good example of Carter’s more general 
point about Washington.
Carter made good his campaign rhetoric by his appointments to the 
CAB. Immediately after taking office, Carter succeeded in appointing to 
the agency economists who favored deregulation, and they immediately 
proceeded to pursue a gradual path of liberalizing reforms. Thus, the 
third stage in reform is an illustration of “agency noncompliance” as a 
means of reform. The CAB proceeded to change radically the nature of 
airline regulation without the slightest hint from congress (other than 
Kennedy’s hearings which produced no legislation, just publicity) that it 
wanted reform. The CAB immediately introduced downward rate flexi­
bility, and changed the rules for route awards. Henceforth, the burden of 
proof would be shifted: instead of the potential entrant having to prove 
that the established carriers were providing inadequate service, the in­
cumbents had to prove that entry would harm service. The latter, while 
essentially impossible to prove, is actually consistent with the “ruinous 
competition” argument that gave rise to regulation. If competition would 
be ruinous, let those who fear it make the case, rather than requiring that 
those who want to compete must prove that competition is not ruinous. 
Finally, the agency began to allow new carriers into the industry.
By these actions, the CAB adopted a new status quo, and the status quo 
bias began to work in its favor. The relevant congressional oversight 
committees were distressed, and immediately began the process of trying 
to stop the reforms. By the time the process could begin, however, a year 




























































































important aspect of the interest-group account of policy change became 
apparent. Before reform, the employees, managers and stockholders of 
the entrants and incumbents that would benefit from deregulation did not 
know who they were. If they were in the industry, all they knew was that, 
on balance, regulation helped the industry, so they supported it. If they 
were not in the industry before reform, they were not organized because 
they did not realize that they would be drawn to the industry by post­
deregulation events. But once reform took place and the winners were 
identified, they stood ready as an organized group to oppose retrench­
ment.
By the time the committees overseeing airline regulation could orga­
nize a counterattack, the industry had become split over the issue of re­
form. Some major carriers had actually prospered under competition be­
cause they were more efficient. Some cities had gained new service, and 
so supported the changes. Aircraft manufacturers, who profited from the 
incentive in the old system to buy new aircraft before they were econom­
ically justified, also profited from the entry of new carriers and the ex­
pansion of old ones, primarily because demand for air travel proved to be 
price-elastic: price reductions substantially increased ticket sales and 
hence the demand by airlines for aircraft. As a result, manufactures, who 
were expected to defend regulation, took no public position on the efforts 
to re-establish the old system. Thus, the retrenchment effort failed.
The preceding events can be illustrated by the theory of structure-in­
duced stability. Figure 3.1 depicts as a single dimension the extent of 
regulation of airlines, with more regulation associated with positions on 
the right side of the line. The figure shows the positions of the relevant 
actors in the prereform and postreform periods, which are divided 
roughly at 1977: S is the status quo ante (regulation), C is the ideal point 
of congress (reflecting the mean position of industry), P is the position of 
the president and the CAB, and 2/3 is the position that is “veto-proof’ -  
the most pro-deregulation position that could not be overturned by 
congress after a presidential veto of a bill reregulating the industry. The 
difference between the two lines simply reflects the difference in orga­

































































































P 2/3 C S
In the pre-reform period, Carter wanted almost total deregulation, but to 
adopt point P would invite legislative reversal. If the President vetoed the 
bill, he would lose the override vote. Hence, the CAB adopted a gradual 
deregulation policy that could withstand a legislative attack because the 
president’s veto could be sustained. Thus, a policy roughly at the “2/3” 
point was adopted. By the time legislation was passed in 1980, the new 
status quo (the position “2/3” in the top half of the figure) had become 
more regulatory than even congress desired. Hence, congress passed, and 
the president signed, a bill abolishing the CAB and all but a few aspects of 
regulation. Congress still fell short of the president’s ideal, because it in­
sisted that the transition to deregulation take five more years, that the De­
partment of Transportation (not the Department of Justice) have jurisdic­
tion over airline mergers (assuring a more pro-industry policy), and that 
the possibility of subsidies of service to small communities be retained to 
guarantee universal service. But these differences were small compared to 
the differences between congress and the president only two years earlier.
Consequences of Reform
On nearly all measures, the performance of the airline industry has been 
substantially better after deregulation than before, but controversial sub­
sequent policy actions have eroded some of the benefits of deregulation. 
Nonetheless, from the perspective of airline customers as a whole, the 
overall effect of deregulation is definitely beneficial.
The most useful basis of comparison for airline prices is the divergence 
of actual prices from the prices that would have been charged had the in­
dustry still used the old CAB price formulas. According to this compari­
son, the average ticket price was about 25 percent lower ten years after 
deregulation than it would have been had airlines still used the old for­




























































































this, for service competition probably would have continued to cause up­
ward readjustments in the formula.
In addition, entry by new airlines and expansion of established ones 
have caused a substantial increase in the number of flights that are flown. 
The increase in flights is true for all communities, large and small, and 
averages about sixty percent above the number of flights just before 
deregulation. Moreover, the increase in flights has generally been accom­
panied by an increase in choice of carrier. As late as 1979, on sixty per­
cent of all trips passengers had either no choice of carrier or a choice 
between only two. By 1988, sixty percent of the trips offered a choice of 
three or more carriers.
The least expected change in the industry has been the complete rear­
rangement of the route system when carriers have a free choice of routes. 
The two most important changes are in commuter service and the design 
of the route structure of an-airline.
First, all major carriers have either entered the commuter airline busi­
ness or become affiliated with a commuter carrier. Commuter flights are 
now scheduled to connect to regular, long distance flights at the nearest 
major airport, and the effect has been a substantial increase in commuter 
traffic. Many small communities have experienced a profound change in 
service: a downgrading from regular airline service to commuter service, 
but a substantial increase in the number of daily flights. The net effect is 
to make more cities easily accessible in a one-stop connecting route.
Second, regular airline routes have been altered to the “hub-spoke” 
system. Instead of flying primarily east-west or north-south routes in a 
cross-hatched route structure, airlines now concentrate operations in a 
small number of cities. Almost all service begins with a flight from a 
hub, with the only exceptions being very long distance flights between the 
nation’s largest cities. This structure enables airlines to concentrate air­
craft maintenance and crew bases in large centers, facilitating substitution 
of aircraft when unplanned repairs are needed and of personnel in health 
emergencies. It also facilitates easy interconnection of flights with com­
muters or between spoke routes, because the airline has so many flights 
originating from the hub. As a result, many more trips require one stop 
and a change of plane at a hub, and many fewer trips are multistop flights 
on a single aircraft. In the past, passengers had been reluctant to change 
aircraft because of the danger that flight delays would cause a missed 
connection; however, hubbing reduces this concern by concentrating so 
many flights out of the point of connection. The effect of the new route 
structure is a substantial reduction in airline costs, accompanied by a 
slight increase in the average duration of a trip because more flights now 
require connections.
The negative consequences of deregulation flow from the changes in 
operating practices. A few cities have lost service in that actual flight fre­
quencies have declined, but the vast majority of cities -  even small ones -  




























































































vice has been that some cities now have commuter flights, using smaller, 
less comfortable, and slightly less safe aircraft, rather than regular ser­
vice using jets. In addition, in a few cases the hub-spoke structure has 
created local airline monopolies. Hubs tend to be located in the larger ci­
ties; however, “large” can mean a city as small as Salt Lake City, Utah, 
Memphis, Tennessee, or Dayton, Ohio. These cities are simply too small 
to support more than one hub, and if a carrier decides to form a hub in a 
relatively small city, its flight frequency is so large that other carriers are 
unlikely to provide it with much service out of their own hubs. In addi­
tion, some larger cities have become monopolized because a single hub- 
bing carrier has been permitted to control nearly all the gates and landing 
times. Thus, one carrier controls nearly all flights in a few major cities, 
such as St. Louis, Missouri, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, and Detroit, Michi­
gan. In cities dominated by a single hubbing carrier, prices are substan­
tially higher, enough so as to offset the overall reductions from deregula­
tion.
A commonly expressed concern is that airline deregulation has caused a 
deterioration of safety. In two senses this claim has some basis. Cities that 
lost regular service to a commuter service have a slight decline in safety 
because smaller aircraft are less safe. In addition, increased flight fre­
quency has made the airways more congested around large airports, 
although the effect thusfar has been to increase the perception of danger 
through close encounters between aircraft. Midair collisions have not in­
creased. Indeed, all measures of flight safety show a continuation of the 
improving trend that has taken place throughout the history of the indus­
try. Deaths, injuries, and accidents per passenger mile continue to decline 
after deregulation as rapidly as they did before.
Nonetheless, airline safety may become an issue in the future. Safety, 
of course, was not deregulated, and no one ever seriously proposed that it 
should be. The Federal Aviation Administration regulates safety, and has 
for decades. It also operates the air traffic control system. The problem 
lies in the fact that the FAA was no larger in 1990 than it was in 1980, 
even though there was a sixty percent increase in flights. Thus, the fre­
quency of aircraft inspection has declined, and the number of controllers 
per take-off and landing has fallen. Perhaps the FAA was excessively 
large in 1980, so that a reduction in the intensity of safety regulation will 
have no long-run effect. Nonetheless, at some point safety regulatory ca­
pacity will have to expand to match the growth of traffic.
Reagan Era Problems
The differences between airline deregulation during the Carter era 
(which actually persisted well into the 1980s because Carter appointees 
were holdovers at the CAB) and the Reagan era are instructive, for they 
point to the effects of the overall ideology of deregulation on the way 




























































































in origin, defended on the grounds of the benefits to consumers. The 
Reagan era policy was the neoconservative form of deregulation, focusing 
primarily on the simpler principle of removing government constraints 
on business. The second term of the Reagan Administration, after policy 
was moved from the CAB to the Department of Transportation, brought 
forth several turns in policy that would not have taken place under a 
populist regime.
The most important was merger policy. The Reagan administration ap­
proved essentially every airline merger that was proposed to it. All of the 
monopolized hubs in larger cities were created by mergers, whereby two 
carriers that had competed out of the city were allowed to merge without 
spinning off to competitors enough gates and landing rights to prevent 
monopolization of the market.
In addition, the Reagan administration failed to come to grips with the 
problem of airline computer reservation systems. Briefly, to succeed in 
the market a CRS must list nearly all flights in the nation. Consequently, 
large, national carriers have a distinct advantage in constructing systems. 
The major national carriers created CRS in the late 1970s, and then when 
almost all travel agencies were automated, used their CRS presence to re­
duce competition in both airlines and CRS. Presently they do so by 
charging high booking fees to other airlines, accounting for nearly half of 
the profit margin for the average ticket. The early entrants also created a 
high entry barrier for other CRS by creating contracts with travel agents 
that made it very costly for agents to switch -  or even to use part time -  
another CRS. Thus, two large CRS -  organized by the two largest air­
lines, American and United -  managed to use these systems to reduce the 
extent to which airline deregulation produced effective competition.
Several solutions have been proposed: divestiture (with a prohibition 
against vertical integration of airlines into CRS), a single regulated joint- 
venture CRS for the entire industry, a prohibition of carrier booking 
fees, and elimination of contract terms with travel agents that retard CRS 
competition. Regulation of CRS was retained after the demise of the 
CAB, and is located in the Department of Transportation, but thusfar the 
agency has refused to take meaningful action. By contrast, in Canada and 
Europe CRS rules provide better safeguards against using a CRS to disad­
vantage competitors or encourage cartelization.
Conclusions
Airline deregulation is not without problems, caused in part by other 
policy failures, notably merger and CRS policies. But these problems 
should not be allowed to deflect attention from the fact that deregulation 
is clearly a success in terms of prices, flight frequencies, and the effi­




























































































The politics of airline regulation are interesting as well. They demon­
strate interesting cases of political entrepreneurship by Edward Kennedy 
and Jimmy Carter, and then the rearrangement of interest groups due to 
the fact of deregulation. They also demonstrate that within the spectrum 
of reforms that would be regarded as deregulatory, a clear difference 
emerges between the neoconservative and populist version. Unfortunate­
ly, some abuses arising from the former regime have given rise to new 
calls for reregulation.
If there is a lesson for other nations in the U.S. experience, it is in the 
restructuring of the U.S. industry after deregulation. Ln all but a few very 
large countries, international travel is the more important part of the in­
dustry. International route structures are determined through governmen­
tal negotiations, with largely irrelevant national boundaries as a major 
constraint. Moreover, international flight frequencies are also established 
through negotiation. So far, liberalization has been minimal in that a car­
rier’s national identity continues to have a substantial effect on where and 
how often it can fly. If liberalization occurs in the EEC, European air­
lines, which already are substantially less efficient than U.S. carriers, can 
be expected to redesign their route structures even more dramatically 
than their U.S. counterparts did.
Moreover, if U.S. experience is a guide, the number of major Euro­
pean airlines providing continent-wide service will be only a handful -  
substantially fewer than one “national champion” carrier per country. Of 
course, U.S. experience may not be relevant because of the unjustifiable 
merger policy pursued by the Reagan administration; however, even 
without these mergers, the U.S. would still have fewer then twelve major 
nationwide carriers in a much larger market with a much greater demand 
for air travel.
Perhaps the unsettling prospects for some national carriers that are 
protected by the present regulatory structure explain why the EEC has 
been reluctant to push too hard for airline liberalization, despite the obvi­
ous fact that the current system operates under a set of principles that are 
completely at variance with the precepts of European economic integra­
tion. Perhaps another contributing factor is the shared desire among EEC 
members to protect rail passenger service from competition with airlines. 
In any case, the consequences are detrimental in two ways: airline service 
is more expensive and less convenient than it would be if carriers were 























































































































































































Lecture #4 -  Air Pollution
The massive expansion of environmental, health and safety regulation in 
the 1970s stands in sharp contrast to the reductions in economic regula­
tion. In the 1970s, the U.S. enacted expansive statutes regulating air pol­
lution, water pollution, solid waste disposal, toxic chemicals, consumer 
product safety, occupational safety, and pesticides. By 1980, the U.S. was 
spending an estimated three percent of GDP on complying with these 
regulations.
For the most part, the expansion of protective regulation predated the 
period of economic liberalization, but not completely. Between 1978 and 
1990, no major new environmental legislation was enacted in the U.S., 
and by 1978 economic deregulation was seriously underway in only the 
airline and telecommunications industries. Nevertheless, during the Rea­
gan years, the administration tried to roll back protective regulatory pol­
icy, but neither the courts nor congress would go along. When liberaliza­
tion was sweeping the economic regulatory domain, it had very little ef­
fect in other regulatory areas.
The focus of this essay is on the regulation of air pollution because only 
this area of protective regulation has been significantly touched by regu­
latory reform. In 1990, substantial new amendments to the Clean Air Act 
were passed which simultaneously increased the scope and stringency of 
air pollution controls yet also significantly changed the basic strategy of 
controlling emissions. Part of the act deals with new emissions standards 
for automobiles, new controls on airborne toxics, and stringent controls 
on power plants to curtail acid rain. But the act also calls for a new em­
phasis on using economic incentive methods to reduce emissions. Hence­
forth, emissions trading will play an important role in reducing emissions 
that cause acid rain, and local pollution control authorities have been 
given legal flexibility to adopt emissions trading and pollution taxes to 
achieve air quality objectives.
Traditional Regulatory Methods
Protective regulation (environmental, health and safety regulation) by the 
federal government began with the Pure Food and Drug Act of 1906, 
which sought to control adulterated and dangerous food and drugs. But 



























































































left to the states until the 1960s. The primary exception was nuclear 
power, but initially the regulatory authority -  the Atomic Energy Com­
mission -  was also the sponsor of the technology, and safety was not re­
garded as a major issue.
Although the most important protective regulatory statutes were en­
acted in the 1970s, the trend toward greater federal control began in 
1962, with the passage of new legislation for drug regulation. The new 
statute created a burden of proof on producers of new drugs to demon­
strate that their products were safe and effective in carefully controlled 
clinical trials. This statute set the tone for nearly two decades of more 
statutes to follow. Regulation used the “command and control” approach 
to protecting citizens against hazards: set a technical standard that a haz­
ard must satisfy in order to be permitted.
The 1960s arguments for federalizing protective regulation were very 
similar to the arguments now given to justify expanding the powers of the 
EEC to issue similar regulations. Separate regulatory standards in each 
state increase the costs of firms that try to sell products in a multijuris- 
dictional area, and can be used by a state to disadvantage products manu­
factured elsewhere. Moreover, federalization captures economies of scale 
in information about the causes of hazards and the technical possibilities 
for ameliorating them. In addition, federalization prevents localities from 
engaging in the Faustian bargain of competing for industries by offering 
lax regulation. Finally, some hazards are inherently multijurisdictional in 
that activities in one state impose hazards in others.
Initially, the U.S. government entered the field of protective regulation 
in only a modest way, serving as a clearing house of technical informa­
tion and as a regulator of last resort when state and local governments 
could not effectively cope with regional problems. Gradually, however, 
federal authority become far more expansive. By 1972, in all of the im­
portant areas of protective regulation, federal agencies set policy goals, 
wrote standards or reviewed (with the right to assert authority) state and 
local standards, and set the rules for products, workplaces, and emissions.
The Standards Process
The standard-setting approach to regulation had two defining features. 
First, it dealt separately with each source of hazard. Second, it specified 
exactly what the owner of a potential hazard had to do in order to comply 
with regulatory policy. In environmental regulation, the standard rarely 
specified a performance objective. Instead, it specified a production or 
emissions control method. The basic idea was to write standards for all 
important sources of pollution by surveying extant technical possibilities 
and telling a polluter to use the one that the regulator thought was appro­
priate.
The environmental regulator had two general guidelines for writing 




























































































as the level that posed no threat to public health. The second was an eco­
nomic feasibility constraint. Existing facilities could not have bankrupting 
regulatory requirements imposed upon them unless they were a direct 
threat to public health. In the vast majority of cases, environmental pol­
lution arises from the combined effects of a large number of separate 
facilities. Hence, no one facility is a threat to public health even if total 
pollution does constitute such a threat. The nonbankrupting constraint 
arose in the U.S. from constitutional protections against government 
seizure of property without just compensation, but even without the con­
stitutional requirement, government officials are unlikely to want to cause 
substantial economic disruption. Moreover, the economic feasibility con­
straint minimized the extent to which protective regulation would reallo­
cate economic activity among localities, and so minimized political resis­
tance to ambitious environmental policy targets. Thus, the task of the 
regulator was to impose technical standards on sources that simultane­
ously would not impose undue economic harm and would protect public 
health.
Two paradigmatic views about protectionist regulatory policy gave rise 
to the adoption of the standard-setting approach. One was “technological 
optimism” -  the view that most human problems will eventually yield to a 
relatively painless technological solution, so that the best way to solve a 
social problem is to develop new technology to deal with it. By setting in 
place a standards system, regulators would be ready to force use of the 
technical fix when it arrived. The other was the “bad actor” theory of 
hazards arising from economic activity. Much of the problem was 
thought to be caused by a few socially irresponsible people who were not 
adopting cheap, best-practice methods to curtail the hazards they created. 
Cleaning up pollution was in large measure a simple matter of identifying 
the bad actors and imposing standards on them.
In air pollution control, the traditional standards approach led to six 
significant types of policy actions. (1) The federal regulator, the Environ­
mental Protection Agency, set Ambient Air Quality Standards (AAQS), 
using scientific studies about the relationship between pollution and 
health. If achieved, the AAQS would eliminate all adverse health effects 
from air pollution. (2) The EPA also set emissions standards for mobile 
sources, defined as a maximum quantity of emissions per mile. Only 
California, with severe smog problems from auto emissions, was per­
mitted to set more rigorous standards, and no state was permitted less 
rigorous regulation. (3) EPA also set “new source performance stan­
dards” (NSPS) for stationary sources, which applied only to newly con­
structed or substantially modified production facilities. Because these fa­
cilities had standards imposed before they were constructed, these stan­
dards were not constrained by the nonbankruptcy constraint, and so were 
generally far more rigorous than standards for existing stationary 
sources. (4) An air quality standard of “prevention of significant deterio­




























































































These areas could not allow the quality of their air to deteriorate, and 
were required to impose NSPS on new facilities. This policy prevented 
clean-air areas from stealing industry from dirty-air areas by writing lax 
standards for new facilities while still satisfying air quality targets. (5) 
EPA delegated to the states the responsibility for developing “state 
implementation plans” (SIP) consisting of standards for existing 
stationary sources that would meet AAQS. States also designated regional 
air quality control authorities to write and enforce these standards. EPA 
then reviewed the SIP, and could, if it found the plan insufficient, assert 
authority and impose a new plan on the state. (6) All standards were 
periodically reviewed to bring them up to date with technology and to 
make corrections based upon the air quality effects of the last round of 
standards. This procedure required that every few years regulators 
review the production and control technology of every production facility 
in the U.S. that was located in a region that did not attain AAQS.
Within a few years the problems with the standards approach were ap­
parent. Initial expectations about the speed with which the U.S. would 
achieve AAQS proved wildly optimistic, and most major cities made only 
very slow progress. The NSPS and PSD rules were surely part of the 
problem, because they created an enormous disincentive to replace old 
polluting facilities with new, less polluting ones, perhaps in areas where 
air pollution was not a problem. Among existing stationary sources, sub­
stantial disparities emerged in the cost of compliance. Facilities that were 
located in polluted areas and that faced significant competition from fa­
cilities in unpolluted areas were given very lax standards, for otherwise 
the facilities would close. Facilities that faced no effective competition 
and a relatively price-insensitive demand were given rigorous standards. 
On a cost-per-ton basis, some facilities ended up paying 100 times as 
much for abatement as other facilities located nearby. Policy was cer­
tainly succeeding in assuring that air pollution control did not cause a re­
allocation of economic activity; however, it was also imposing substantial 
costs while making little progress toward achieving air quality goals.
Incentive Regulation
The concept of incentive regulation arose as a means to escape ineffective 
but costly standards regulation. Attacking both parts of the problem -  
costs and effectiveness -  was important, for only then could reform cap­
ture the two main political constituencies concerned about environmental 
policy, business and environmentalists. The cost of environmental regula­
tion ought to be of concern to environmentalists for three main reasons. 
First, in large urban areas the attainment of reasonably unpolluted air was 
simply not possible in any foreseeable time unless a regulatory approach 
could be found that was less costly than the standards system. Second, 




























































































minimized when regulation is efficient, in part because efficient regula­
tion encourages the restructuring of the local economy in favor of less- 
polluting industries. The effect is less pollution per production worker, 
and less need for forcing people to relocate or become unemployed to 
achieve air pollution policy goals. Third, efficient regulation reduces the 
political resistance to environmental policy. If it is cheaper to achieve air 
quality goals, some sources of pollution will find it cheaper to comply 
than to fight the system politically, and all sources will have a smaller net 
willingness to pay for anti-environmental policies because they will have 
less to gain from their repeal.
Incentive regulation methods are market-based systems of environmen­
tal control that produce emissions control targets at least cost. Incentive 
methods reduce compliance costs in two ways. First, they contribute to 
static efficiency in that they lead to a situation in which the last unit of 
abated emissions imposes the same incremental cost at all facilities. Hence, 
no further cost reductions are possible by reallocating emissions among 
sources. Second, they contribute to dynamic efficiency by encouraging 
technological progress in emissions control technology. If under a stan­
dards system the binding limit on emissions control requirements is eco­
nomic feasibility, technological progress can only harm a polluting facil­
ity. A new cost-reducing emissions control system will lead regulators 
simply to tighten the emissions standard until, again, the economic feasi­
bility constraint is reached. As a result, all of the benefits of cost reduc­
tion are captured in reduced emissions. If a source is uncontrolled be­
cause current technology is economically infeasible, technological pro­
gress can lead to a lower-cost control that is economically feasible, and so 
imposes a new cost on the source. Under incentive regulation, a more ef­
ficient control system benefits the polluting firm.
Both of these effects arise from a key property of incentive regulation: 
the costs faced by a source of pollution include both abatement costs and a 
cost of emissions. Because companies seek to minimize total costs, placing 
a cost on emissions balances the incentives between emitting more pollu­
tion or installing better emissions control systems.
Emissions Taxes
One method of incentive regulation is emissions taxes, whereby firms are 
charged for each unit of emissions. A company will abate emissions up to 
the point at which the cost of further abatement exceeds the tax savings 
that more abatement would permit. Overall emissions targets are achieved 
by setting the tax high enough so that, collectively, the polluting facilities 
in an area minimize the sum of taxes plus abatement costs by abating 
enough so that overall targets are met. Because all companies face the 
same tax, they all abate until further abatement costs equal the tax, and so 
abatement is efficient: abatement responsibilities cannot be reallocated 




























































































The primary problem with emissions taxes is that tax revenues are col­
lected, so that the cost of the policy to a company is abatement costs plus 
taxes, not just abatement costs. Even if the government used emissions 
taxes to reduce other business taxes, many firms would end up worse off 
with an emissions tax system than with an inefficient standards system. 
Hence, no government has made extensive use of emissions taxes. In the 
instances in which they have been used, the purpose of the tax has been to 
pay for the regulatory system or to subsidize pollution abatement, rather 
than to create effective abatement incentives. Thus, the emissions tax ap­
proach, although attractive from the standpoint of efficiency and effec­
tiveness, is probably politically infeasible.
Emissions Trading
The other incentive approach is emissions trading, in which regulators 
establish an overall emissions ceiling for a region, adopt a procedure for 
allocating emissions permits for this amount of total emissions among 
sources of pollution, and allow sources to buy and sell emissions permits. 
Emissions trading has exactly the same economic incentive effects as a 
tax: a company will abate pollution beyond its permit holdings if it can 
sell the permits for a greater amount than the abatement costs. Likewise, 
a firm facing especially high abatement costs will buy permits from a 
company facing lower costs.
The numerical example in Table 4.1 illustrates the point, showing the 
costs of abating pollution from two sources. The
Figure 4.1: Abatement Costs and Emissions Trades
COMPANY A COMPANY B
Amount Total Added
Abated Cost Cost
















"Amount Abated” refers to the physical quantity of emissions per time 
period (usually, per day). “Total Cost” refers to the amount spent on 
abating the quantity on the corresponding line. “Added cost” is the incre­




























































































moving from 2 to 3 units of abatement adds $300 to total abatement costs. 
Suppose that the total emissions ceiling is ten units, and that five units 
each have been assigned to each company. Thus, if each firm has a total 
uncontrolled emissions of eight, then each has been given three emissions 
permits. Each could abate by five units, but this would be inefficient. In­
stead, Company B will offer to buy a unit of emissions from Company A. 
The former can save the added cost of $700 from increasing abatement 
from 4 to 5 units, whereas the latter will need to spend only $500 to in­
crease abatement from 5 to 6. Thus, at any price of an emissions permit 
between $500 and $700, both companies are better off from having 
traded. The rest of society is also better off as well, because, at no sacri­
fice of environmental goals, the two companies have reduced their costs, 
and hence the prices for their products will be lower, and more resources 
will be available for producing other things.
In reality, emissions trading is more complicated than the example. To 
begin, costs differences among polluters are larger than the differences in 
the table, so that there is more to be gained from trading than this exam­
ple illustrates. In addition, an air quality region contains far more than 
two sources of pollution. As a result, firms will probably have to devote 
more effort to finding trading partners than in the example, but there will 
also be less uncertainty about the trading price. With a large number of 
companies, trading will quickly establish a stable permit price, rather 
than arise from negotiations as in the example.
The regulatory requirements for an emissions trading system to be ef­
fective at minimizing costs and controlling pollution are straightforward, 
but not necessarily simple. First, regulators must establish an emissions 
baseline for each source. The baseline is the initial allocation of permits 
to a source, which it can then simply treat as a standard by reducing 
emissions to be consistent with the permit. Second, the regulator needs to 
monitor all trades in order to keep track of emissions by source in order 
to enforce the overall emissions ceiling for the region. Third, a mecha­
nism must be in place for firms to demonstrate that they are actually 
emitting no more than the quantity of permits that they hold. Fourth, 
regulators still need to monitor air quality throughout the region to be 
sure that “hot spots” do not emerge -  locations where pollution accumu­
lation is especially heavy. In some cases, to achieve air quality goals, 
some sources may be forced to engage in additional abatement; however, 
these controls can be financed in part by selling permits to others whose 
emissions do not contribute to the hot spot. Fifth, regulators may want to 
facilitate the development of a trading system by organizing the emissions 
market. By establishing a regular time and place for trading, and publi­





























































































The most challenging problem for all methods of environmental regula­
tion is designing an effective enforcement system. Basically, the job of 
enforcement consists of checking facilities to be sure that their emissions 
match their allowances, regardless of how the allowances are determined 
(standards, trades, taxes). In the standards system, because standards are 
usually based on the use of a technology rather than actual emissions, en­
forcement is in some sense easier because all an inspector has to do is 
check whether the technology is installed and working. But this enforce­
ment mechanism is easier only because it is not concerned with actual 
performance. If regulators are to succeed in curtailing total emissions un­
der an overall pollution ceiling, they must base standards on performance 
and measure actual emissions. At that point, the essence of the enforce­
ment problem is the same for all methods: determine how much is actu­
ally being emitted.
Emissions monitoring can proceed in three ways. For large production 
facilities, “continuous emissions monitoring” is not only technically and 
economically feasible, it is often already required. Trades of emissions 
permits create no problems here, because the permits of a company can 
easily be checked against emissions records. “Random intermittent moni­
toring” can be used when continuous monitoring is infeasible. With this 
approach, inspectors arrive unannounced to a facility with mobile mea­
suring systems and monitor emissions. The results are then checked 
against permit holdings. The third approach is “emissions modelling,” in 
which estimates are made of the emissions that arise when a particular 
technology is used and a production facility is operating. Companies keep 
records of hours of operations, and inspectors make random checks to be 
sure that controls are working and that production records are accurate.
The last system is the least accurate, but it is the one that is most easily 
developed from a standards system. Generally, it requires a regulatory 
process to ascertain the emissions performance of a control method. 
Hence, it requires prior approval by a regulator that a particular control 
method actually meets emissions ceilings. This approach can cause emis­
sions trading to require more enforcement for sources that are monitored 
by emissions modelling methods. Every time a company makes a trade 
and changes its emissions control methods, it must go through a standards 
review to estimate the emissions arising from the new method. In the pre­
sent system, standards reviews occur approximately every five years; in 
principle, a source might make trades more frequently than this, and in 
any case coordinating standards review and trades could make the system 
cumbersome. Nevertheless, the result is not a loss of enforcement or 
control, for trades could not be completed until standards reviews were 
finished. Moreover, because the process is cumbersome, companies and 




























































































other two methods, both of which are more accurate and less bureau­
cratic.
Emissions Trading Experience in the U. S.
Serious attempts to control air pollution on a nationwide scale were not 
attempted until after the passage of the Clean Air Act of 1970. Before 
then, only a handful of large metropolitan areas had attempted a compre­
hensive plan to reduce air pollution, with the most notable examples being 
Pittsburgh’s program to reduce pollution from steel production and Cali­
fornia’s actions to reduce photochemical smog in Los Angeles. In both 
cities, the defects of the standards approach had not become apparent. 
Pittsburgh succeeded in substantially improving air quality by writing 
standards for a single industry -  steel. By 1970, Los Angeles had attacked 
smog by imposing controls on a small number of large sources, primarily 
electric generation facilities which were required to use natural gas as a 
boiler fuel during the most smoggy parts of the year, and by limiting au­
tomobile emissions. By 1970, regulators knew that the first set of stan­
dards would not solve the problem, but they had not yet embarked on a 
systematic attempt to control all significant sources in the region. Thus, in 
1970, the federal government initiated the standards approach for na­
tionwide air pollution control.
Controlled Trading
Before a decade had passed, the standards approach was rather obviously 
not working as well as had been expected. In the major cities where pol­
lution was worst, the best economically feasible standards for old sources 
(plus NSPS and strict auto emissions controls) had only marginally im­
proved air quality. Soon after taking office, the Carter administration, 
which had emphasized the inefficiency of regulatory policy in the cam­
paign, instituted a program of “controlled trading options.” All three 
words of the program were important: trading because the program did 
allow emissions trading among sources; controlled because the method of 
trading was cumbersome and ruled out many types of trades; and options 
because local pollution control authorities were not required to adopt the 
system. The Carter program represented an attempt to make the adoption 
of incentive systems purely a question of implementation method, paired 
with continued support for environmental improvement. Thus, the pro­
gram was intended to appeal to both environmentalists who were disap­
pointed with progress in improving environmental quality and businesses 
who sought a cheaper, more flexible regulatory system.
The details of the program clearly embodied both concerns, but in so 
doing restricted trading possibilities so greatly that the effect of the pro­




























































































of sources that already had standards written for them could collectively 
propose new standards for the entire group, but subject to four major 
conditions.
First, the new standards had to reduce emissions, not just reallocate 
them. Depending on the case and locality, these reductions varied from 
ten to fifty percent. Thus, there was no reason to propose trades unless 
the cost saving was so large that the sources could increase abatement ef­
forts substantially and still reduce total compliance costs.
Second, the new pattern of emissions had to go through the traditional 
standard-setting process, usually leading not to a performance standard 
but a technology control standard. Because almost all standards were not 
expressed as a ceiling on total daily emissions, but instead as a particular 
method of control, the trading partners had to estimate the emissions 
from the old standards, estimate the emissions from the new methods of 
control, prove that the latter was substantially lower than the former, and 
convince the regulators that their evidence about performance of the two 
sets of standards was correct. In addition, they had to prove that the new 
set of standards was as easily enforced as the old. Again, rigid adherence 
to aspects of the standards process that were a weakness (an orientation 
toward control methods rather than performance) reduced the attractive­
ness of trading.
Third, trades were not allowed that enabled firms to avoid certain na­
tional standards rules. For example, a new facility could not trade out 
from under NSPS by abating elsewhere rather than by adopting the rig­
orous standards for new facilities. New facilities that adopted NSPS were 
required to reduce pollution elsewhere ("offsets") in the amount of emis­
sions arising from the new facility after NSPS standards were met. These 
offset trades could take credit only for controls beyond something called 
“best available control technology,” which was the method presently on 
the market that reduced emissions for the offset partner by the greatest 
amount. To control beyond this, the new facility usually had to redesign 
the production facility of the offset partner.
Fourth, trades were not permitted across pollutants. For example, 
photochemical smog and acid rain both have numerous components, but 
national air quality standards are set separately for several components. 
Thus, for example, a source could not offset emissions of oxides of nitro­
gen by reducing emissions of sulfur oxides.
The reasons for the severe restrictions on trading systems were essen­
tially political. Environmental groups were extremely skeptical of eco­
nomics as a useful tool in environmental policy making. Economic bene­
fit-cost analysis often reached negative conclusions about policy objectives 
that environmental groups favored. In fact, these studies had to cope with 
two serious sources of bias. On the cost side, polluters usually had the 
best estimates of abatement costs, and would attempt to convince regula­
tors and their policy analysts that costs were likely to be higher than per­




























































































were primitive to nonexistent for such things as aesthetic effects or mi­
nor, non-debilitating health effects, and were normatively dubious for 
morbidity and mortality. Thus, the early experience of environmentalists 
was to regard economics as generally hostile to their policy objectives.
A second problem was that some environmentalists reacted to the fail­
ures of the standards system by turning away even further from the con­
cept of efficiency. The combined technological optimism and bad actor 
views of 1970 had given way to a pessimistic belief that environmental 
pollution was an inherent feature of a capitalistic, mass consumption so­
ciety. Hence, if emissions trading was attractive to large corporations in 
the manufacturing and energy sectors, then it must be detrimental to the 
long-term policy objectives of environmentalists.
A more common belief among environmentalists was that the failures 
of environmental regulation during the 1970-77 period were due primar­
ily to the fact that Republican Richard Nixon, an ally of business, had 
overseen the first few years of operation of the Environmental Protection 
Agency. The failure of policy, then, was due to the fact that it was not 
conscientiously carried out. A Democratic president, giving greater 
weight to environmental concerns, would do better.
For all of these reasons, environmentalists opposed any significant use 
of incentive mechanisms in environmental policy. Because Democrats 
controlled congress and the presidency, environmentalists were guaran­
teed influence in how the new administration reformed the system it in­
herited in 1977. The emphasis of the new program was going to be 
tougher standards and tougher enforcement, with some experimenting at 
the margins with emissions trading.
In the ensuing years, despite the restrictions, several thousand trades 
took place, saving pollution sources several billions dollars. Even envi­
ronmentalists agreed that trading had not undermined environmental 
policy goals, but instead in some cases had facilitated them. Trades not 
only led to small (overall) reductions in emissions, but they also gave 
sources a reason to explore new abatement methods so that a trade could 
be consummated. These new methods, then, could be required of other 
sources when standards were revised for old facilities. Hence, by the mid 
1980s, environmentalist opposition to trading was not so intense. More­
over, the Republicans again controlled the presidency and, in addition, the 
Senate, so that lower-cost methods for achieving environmental policy 
objectives were a necessary component of any proposal for additional 
progress in reducing emissions.
Lead Trading
The next major environmental initiative was to remove lead from motor 
vehicle fuel. The EPA proposed an ambitious plan to all but eliminate 
lead from gasoline, but a key part of the program was a trading program 




























































































down. The system set lead usage targets for each refinery which dropped 
precipitously over a few years. Each refinery could reduce the amount of 
lead in leaded gasoline, and the amount of leaded gasoline produced, by 
the target amount each year, but this quickly became inefficient. Produc­
ing small amounts of leaded fuel at a large number of facilities was eco­
nomically irrational. Letting refineries trade leaded-fuel production 
rights concentrated production of leaded fuel in a dwindling number of 
facilities.
The leaded fuel program was clearly the most successful air pollution 
program that the EPA had ever launched. Within a few years virtually all 
of the nation was not only in compliance with the AAQS for lead, but was 
well below the maximum concentration that was permitted. Moreover, 
the policy objective had been accomplished almost painlessly. Trading in 
lead permits had been brisk, and the production and distribution of refin­
ery products had not suffered a loss of efficiency. Of course, the problem 
of lead pollution was not an especially difficult one to solve: the pollutant 
is easy to control and to measure, and reasonably good substitutes were 
readily available. Nonetheless, the program did work, and it was clearly 
facilitated by the trading program. Trading not only reduced the transi­
tion cost to unleaded fuels, it reduced the opposition of part of the indus­
try, small refiners. The small refiners could not efficiently reduce pro­
duction of leaded fuels. They required either essentially no change or 
zero use of lead. Because immediate cessation of production of leaded 
fuels was impractical and unnecessary, a standards approach would have 
been hopelessly bogged down in deciding which refineries could produce 
the small amount of fuel that was still needed. Trading solved the prob­
lem. A small refinery could profit from its share of production of leaded 
gasoline by selling its permits rather than producing itself.
CFC Trading
The next event in using emissions trading was in connection with the re­
duction of chlorofluorocarbons, the ozone-depleting chemicals. The 
Montreal Protocols, an international treaty dealing with ozone depletion, 
requires each signatory (including the U.S. and Europe) to reduce both 
production and usage of CFCs by fifty percent over a decade. Fresh from 
the success with lead, in 1989 the U.S. instituted a production trading 
program to achieve its CFC production targets.
The CFC program is more complicated than the lead program, for it 
covers several different chemicals. These chemicals differ in reactivity 
(the extent to which the chemical will destroy ozone), so that the benefits 
of curtailing them differ. Thus, the trading program defines a permit in 
reactivity units, not physical quantities. Trading across chemical entities is 
permitted, but the quantities of the chemicals .must be inversely propor­
tional to their reactivities. As with lead, producers of chlorofluorocar­




























































































each gradually winding down production, the industry can capture scale 
economies by trading production rights.
The 1990 Clean Air Act
By far the most ambitious step toward the use of economic incentives in 
environmental regulation was the adoption of new air pollution legislation 
in 1990. The new act sets up a detailed program for trading sulfur emis­
sions in order to control acid rain, and it allows local air pollution con­
trol authorities to use either trading or emissions taxes to achieve air 
quality objectives. The actual effect of the latter portion of the act is still 
somewhat in doubt, for, as is always the case in the U.S., the courts 
eventually will decide how radical a departure from the status quo the 
new legislation permits. The dominant legal opinion at this writing is that 
economic incentive methods can completely replace the entire standards 
system as long as the regulators can make the case that they are not losing 
enforcement capability. The only exception is that new facilities still 
probably will be required to satisfy NSPS, although even this view is dis­
puted by some, and will no doubt be tested in court.
Acid Rain
The acid rain program is actually quite similar to the lead and CFC pro­
grams in most respects. Oxides of sulfur come in only two forms, sulfate 
and sulfur dioxide, and the extent to which they acidify rain is well 
known -  just as is the reactivity of different CFC chemicals. Emissions 
can be easily expressed in “ton-equivalents” to sulfur dioxide for trading 
purposes. Moreover, nearly all sulfur is introduced into the environment 
by burning hydrocarbon fuels that contain sulfur: fuel oil, gasoline, or 
coal. Ascertaining the sulfur content of fuel is easy, and so measuring 
how much is retained by emissions control systems (and how much, 
therefore, is emitted) is a relatively simple task.
The new acid rain program makes the important leap of defining the 
obligations of polluters in terms of emissions quantities, not fuel con­
sumed, the technology used to desulfurize fuel, or the method of trapping 
sulfur emissions. This step is a major advance by itself, for in the past 
standards had specified control methods rather than an emissions objec­
tive. The program simply specifies that the major sources of sulfur emis­
sions must reduce total emissions by ten million tons per year in ten 
years.
The 1990 legislation provides a provisional initial allocation of emis­
sions rights to over 200 facilities in the U.S. EPA is left the task of refin­
ing the initialization system, but in the end major sulfur sources will be­
gin the emissions reduction period with a clear target for abatement over 
a ten year period. These sources can then trade permits so that the pattern 




























































































A major innovation, enacted in the law, is the development of a new 
market mechanism for facilitating trading. Because many facilities pro­
duce sulfur emissions, trading partners might experience some difficulty 
in finding each other. Moreover, if trades are negotiated privately, the 
price may not be made public. Open pricing helps other potential traders 
calculate whether they, too, should buy or sell permits. To assure a regu­
lar, publicly visible market, the act sets up a “zero revenue auction” for 
2.8 percent of all sulfur emissions. All sources must make available for 
sale 2.8 percent of their permits. Each source then submits a bid, stating 
how many permits it wants and how much it is willing to pay for them. 
Anyone may submit a bid -  a new facility, or even an environmental or­
ganization that wants to reduce emissions by more than the target amount 
and intends not to use the permits it buys. The EPA then calculates the 
price at which the quantity demanded equals the amount available for 
auction. Successful bidders buy permits at this price, and the facilities 
from which the permits were taken receive the same price for the permits 
that they lost. Thus, the government does not keep the revenue from the 
auction, instead returning it to the facilities holding the permits. Firms 
that lose permits do so because they bid less than the ultimate market 
price for the permits that they held. Presumably they bid less because 
their abatement costs were lower than the value of their permits, for a 
firm can always keep all of its permits at zero net cost by bidding an in­
finite price for them. The firm would then both pay and receive infinite 
amounts, thereby breaking even but retaining its permits. By bidding a 
lower price equal to abatement costs, if a firm sells its permits the rev­
enues finance the seller’s additional abatement, with a profit left over.
The new acid rain trading program is not yet implemented, for the 
EPA must still write the details of the process. Consequently, the pro­
gram can not yet be evaluated. Nevertheless, the program is an important 
next step for the U.S. experiment in using incentive regulation. If it 
works well, more widespread use of trading -  with the auction method -  
is sure to follow.
Los Angeles Smog
Experiments by local pollution control authorities to take advantage of 
the new law are being designed. The nation’s largest and most sophisti­
cated local authority, in Los Angeles, is examining the feasibility of using 
emissions trading to deal with photochemical smog, which is caused pri­
marily by the interactions of sunlight, water vapor, oxides of nitrogen, 
and reactive organic gasses (ROG). Incorporating ROG into a trading 
system will be a major innovation, for literally hundreds of organic 
chemicals need to be included. ROG emissions come from a long list of 
industrial processes (almost all solvents emit ROG), and an equally long 
list of consumer products (paint, liquid cleaning solutions, hair spray, 




























































































because they come from highly dispersed and very small sources. One 
approach would be to set standards for literally hundreds of thousands of 
products, specifying the maximum amount of each vaporizing organic 
chemical that each product could contain. These standards would be en­
forced by acquiring and testing a vast array of products. The standards 
approach has indeed begun for some industrial processes. For example, in 
the manufacturing of integrated circuits, regulatory standards specify 
how many times per day each production worker can dip a cotton swab 
into a solvent for the purpose of cleaning the newly produced chip (a 
classic example of an input standard that is only remotely related to 
achieving environmental objectives).
Under the proposed ROG trading systems, regulators will control the 
total amount of ROG entering the region by licensing products. Each 
product will specify its chemical content, so that this content times its re­
gional use determines its emissions. Producers will be given a ceiling on 
total ROG content, which can be met by curtailing production, changing 
the chemical composition of the product, or buying permits from some­
one else. The enforcement mechanism is as yet not clear, but one possi­
bility would be a system similar to the stamps used in taxing alcoholic 
beverages and cigarettes. The stamping can be done by regulators in a 
single central location, or by product distributors using metered stamping 
devices. Enforcement would consist of checking to determine whether 
product containers at points of sale and use were stamped.
The Los Angeles experiment is still in the design stage, and so remains 
uncertain in concept and performance. Indeed, it may not be implemented 
in so ambitious a form because regulators may not be willing to take the 
risk, or because a court may stand in the way. Nonetheless, the willing­
ness of front-line regulatory authorities even to attempt so radical a de­
parture from traditional standard setting stands as testimony to the 
ripeness of these reforms.
Conclusions
Incentive regulation in environmental policy is now being given a serious 
chance in the United States. As yet, a relatively small part of the nation’s 
overall environmental regulatory system is experimenting with the use of 
incentives, but if the experiments continue to work as well as the early ef­
forts, radical reform may be in the works.
A common feature of the reforms to date has been that they have re­
ceived the support of at least some members of both business and envi­
ronmental groups. By severely constraining the controlled trading op­
tions, the Carter administration gained the grudging assent of some envi­
ronmentalists. Each successive step could be a bit more flexible and ex­




























































































An extremely important feature of the standards process was that it 
froze in place the basic economic structure of the country, by both indus­
try and geography, due to PSD and NSPS. These policies greatly benefit- 
ted established production facilities in industries that contribute signifi­
cantly to air pollution by raising the costs of competitive entry. These 
policies remain in force under the new regime. However, the third major 
barrier to economic restructuring -  the economic feasibility constraint on 
standards -  has been vastly weakened. Local industries with high emis­
sions, low abatement costs, but weak standards because they cannot pass 
along price increases will now either abate (by selling some emissions at a 
price higher than their abatement costs) or will simply close down 
(selling all of their permits at a price that exceeds the value of the pro­
duction facility). The result will be an economically warranted restruc­
turing, with the most polluting industries either reducing emissions or 
leaving areas where air pollution is the worst.
A significant political advantage of emissions trading is that it enables 
rationalization of air pollution control efforts without eliminating the 
features of the standards approach that protected established facilities. 
Firms can capitalize the profits from their protected position by simply 
selling their generous allotment of emissions permits from a regulatory 
system that could not impose significant economic harm on them. Now 
that all of the obvious, relatively inexpensive controls are in place on fa­
cilities that could afford significant abatement costs, and air quality ob­
jectives are still not met, the firms with lax standards are in an enviable 
position. If, for example, Los Angeles decrees an equal percentage re­
duction in emissions from all sources, and then allocates emissions per­
mits to each source in this new amount, sources with lax standards will be 
able to sell their permits at a very handsome price to the sources that al­
ready have rigorous standards. In this way, emissions trading provides a 
means whereby the wealth protections in the old system do not continue 
to stand in the way of more effective and efficient abatement strategies.
More than other regulatory reform measures, the lessons of emissions 
trading in the U.S. are more transparently transferrable to other nations. 
Many industries contribute to core air, water and waste disposal prob­
lems, so that even in a small country, numerous production facilities can 
be brought into a market system. For example, the decade-long bottle 
controversy in the European Economic Community reflects a classic 
problem of standards regulation. The point of encouraging bottle reuse 
and recycling is to reduce solid waste disposal problems and energy costs. 
Attacking these problems on a product-by-product basis is certain to be 
wasteful and ineffective, and in die process to create enclaves of protected 
interests (as the European Commission has claimed regarding the Danish 
and German bottle control systems). Energy taxes, disposal taxes, and 
tradable permits continent wide for using new physical materials are all 
more promising approaches for achieving simultaneously objectives re­




























































































To claim that recent reforms of environmental regulation are the wave 
of the future is surely premature. As yet, no complex environmental issue 
has been successfully attacked using incentive regulation, simply because 
none has been in place long enough to produce clear performance indica­
tors. But the incentive approach is likely to have its chance during the 
next few years, primarily because of widespread agreement that it is the 
last hope for relatively painless attainment of environmental policy ob­
jectives. If it works, the implications are far greater than the conse­























































































































































































The theoretical and empirical literature on the economics and politics of 
regulation is extensive and rapidly growing. The purpose of this note is to 
provide logical entry points for readers who seek further depth on the 
topics discussed in the four Jean Monnet Lectures.
By far the best place to begin for a summary of the most recent schol­
arship on regulatory policy is Part 5 of the Handbook o f Industrial Or­
ganization, edited by Richard Schmalensee and Robert Willig and pub­
lished by North Holland in 1990. The economic effects of regulation are 
summarized by two essays, “The Effects of Economic Regulation” by 
Paul Joskow and Nancy Rose and “The Economics of Health, Safety and 
Environmental Regulation” by Howard Gruenspecht and Lester Lave. 
The politics of regulation, as illuminated by economic models of political 
processes, is covered in “Economics Perspectives on the Politics of Regu­
lation” by Roger Noll. In addition, Part 5 contains two essays dealing 
with price regulation: “Optimal Policies for Natural Monopolies” by 
Ronald Brauetigam and “Design of Regulatory Mechanisms and Institu­
tions” by David Baron. These five papers reference essentially all of the 
important theoretical and empirical work covered in the four lectures and 
published before 1989.
Lecture 1 on the politics of regulation has its origins in the three giant 
classics from which the modem economic theory of politics is derived: 
Kenneth Arrow, Social Choice and Individual Values', Anthony Downs, 
An Economic Theory o f Democracy, and Mancur Olson, The Logic o f 
Collective Action. These books are important primarily for their 
methodological advance, rather than their specific conclusions. Their 
three main messages (that majority rule voting has no equilibrium, that 
political campaigns have low information content, and that organized in­
terests are advantaged in democracies) were hardly new to political sci­
entists; however, all three books vastly expanded and deepened under­
standing of these three ideas by constructing careful theoretical arguments 
derived from microeconomic theory.
The first influential application of the economic theory of politics to 
regulatory policy was George Stigler’s “The Theory of Economic Regu­
lation," Bell Journal o f Economics (1971). Stigler and his colleagues at 
the University of Chicago have built their theory of regulation on the 
principle of interest-group organization and influence. As mostly recently 
explicated, the Chicago theory is argued to predict that regulatory policy 
redistributes wealth as interest-group theory predicts, but that it tends to 
do so without creating substantial inefficiencies, since inefficiency creates 
an incentive for bargains among groups that can enhance the wealth of 
all. Recent statements of the Chicago theory can be found in Gary Becker, 
“Public Policies, Pressure Groups, and Dead Weight Costs”, Journal of 
Public Economics (1985) and Sam Peltzman, “The Economic Theory of 



























































































nomic activity: Microeconomic (1989). The latter examines the record in 
several deregulated industries to test the Chicago school model.
The other primary stream of research on the politics of regulation 
within the economics paradigm deals with how the institutional arrange­
ments of government shape incentives for political action and, hence, 
policy outcomes. The vast majority of this work deals explicitly with the 
American federal system, focusing on the details of the U.S. structure. 
The reason is that this literature focuses on how institutions solve various 
collective action problems, and is written almost exclusive by Americans, 
who naturally choose U.S. institutions to make their points. Some exam­
ples are; on delegation to bureaucrats, Mathew McCubbins, “The Legisla­
tive Design of Regulatory Structure”, American Journal o f Political 
Science (1985); on the relationship between the design of bureaucratic 
agencies and policy outcomes, Mathew McCubbins, Roger Noll and Barry 
Weingast, “Structure and Process, Politics and Policy”, Virginia Law 
Review  (1989); and on the principles underlying the organization of 
legislatures for policy making, Barry Weingast and William Marshall, 
“The industrial Organization of Congress”, Journal o f Political Economy 
(1988).
Political scientists do not necessarily agree with the conclusions of eco­
nomic theories of regulation and deregulation. The clearest statement of 
the argument that ideas and key people are responsible for reform is 
Martha Derthick and Paul Quirk, The Politics o f Deregulation, and for a 
well executed compendium of traditional political science studies of regu­
lation, see James O. Wilson, The Politics o f Regulation.
The recent research literature on telecommunications policy (Lecture 
2) is extremely voluminous, so that identifying a short list of key sources 
is somewhat arbitrary. Two interesting compendia are Stephen Bradley 
and Jerry Hausman, Future Competition in Telecommunications, and 
Barry Cole, After the Break-up. For a detailed account of the antitrust 
case against AT&T, see Roger Noll and Bruce Owen, “The Anticompeti­
tive Uses of Regulation: U.S. v. AT&T”, in John Kwoka and Lawrence 
White, The Antitrust Revolution. For an account of the influence of 
Congress on post-divestiture regulation, see John Ferejohn and Charles 
Shipan, “Congress and Telecommunications Policymaking”, in Paula 
Newberg, New Directions in Telecommunications Policy, Vol. 1. The 
Cole book contains a paper by Roger Noll and Susan Smart that contains 
extensive data about telephone prices during the period of reform, enti­
tled “Pricing of Telephone Services.”
Airline deregulation has also been extensively studied (Lecture 3). 
Analysis of a wide range of issues can be found in Steven Morrison and 
Clifford Winston, “Enhancing the Performance of the Deregulated 
Transportation System”, Brookings Papers on Economic Activity: Mi­
croeconomics (1989). Severn Borenstein has written several important 
papers on the post-deregulation airline industry, especially “Hubs and 




























































































tance of the new route structure); “Airlines Mergers, Airport Dominance 
and Market Power”, American Economic Review (1990) (examining how 
lax antitrust policy affected the gains from deregulation); and, with 
Martin Zimmerman, “Market Incentives for Safe Commercial Airline 
Operation”, American Economic Review (1988) (addressing the relation­
ship between market competition and airline safety).
In addition, Elizabeth Bailey and Jeffrey Williams, “Sources of Eco­
nomic Rent in the Deregulated Airline Industry”, Journal of Law and 
Economics (1988) examines why the airline industry is unlikely to pro­
duce a perfectly competitive outcome. To date, a thorough examination of 
the effects of deregulation on labor in the airline industry had not been 
undertaken to my knowledge; however, such work has been undertaken 
for trucking deregulation; Nancy Rose, “Labor Rent-Sharing and Regula­
tion: Evidence from the Trucking Industry”, Journal of Political Econ­
omy (1987).
Environmental reform (Lecture 4), being the most recent policy inno­
vation, has been least extensively researched. For a summary of the stan­
dards system and how it could evolve into a system of emissions trading, 
see Roger Noll, “The Feasibility of Tradable Emissions Permits in the 
U.S.”! in Jorg Finsinger, Public Sectors Economics. A summary of how 
the evolution actually took place can be found in Robert Hahn, “Economic 
Prescriptions for Environmental Problems”, Journal of Economic Per­
spectives (1989). An excellent treatment of the overall effects of all forms 
of regulation of automobiles -  emissions, fuel economy, safety -  is pre­
sented in Robert Crandall, Howard Gruenspecht, Theodore Keller and 
Lester Lave, Regulating the Automobile. The classic work outlining how 
economic protectionism and environmentalism formed an alliance to 
shape air pollution policy in the 1970s is Bruce Ackerman and William 
Hassler, Clean AirlDirty Coal, are more formal treatment of this alliance 
in shaping the Clean Air Act is contained in the article by McCubbins, 
Noll and Weingast cited above. The most detailed test of the economic 
theory of regulation as applied to environmental policy is Wesley Magat, 
Alan Krupnick and Winston Harrington, Rules in the Making, which 
contains a wealth of statistical information about water pollutions stan­
dards in the U.S. (no similar analysis has yet been undertaken for air 
pollution standards). Finally, Robert Hahn and Alan McGartland provide 
an extensive political economic analysis of the Montreal protocols for 
CFC emissions in “The Political Economy and Instrument Choice”, 
Northwestern University Law Review (1989).
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